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  INTRODUCTION   
To understand Google, there are worse places to look than 
the New York Times editorial pages. Not because the Times has 
some special insight into this search colossus, but rather pre-
cisely because it does not. In 2009 and 2013, the Times pub-
lished a pair of mirror-image op-eds, one each for and against 
the company, presenting the toughest allegations against it and 
the broadest defense of its actions. Each of them expresses 
something like the conventional wisdom about Google. And in 
the contrast between them can be seen something of why it is 
so hard to know just what to do about search engines.1
 
 1. In a previous article, I presented a descriptive taxonomy of legal and 
policy issues relating to search engines. See generally James Grimmelmann, 
The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2007). This Article 
adds a normative framework for resolving those issues. Search engines are a 
distinctive category of interest for reasons spelled out in more detail infra Part 
III: their unique capacity to help numerous diverse users achieve their per-
sonal individual goals. Google will serve as the principal example, because of 
the long shadow it casts on American law, culture, and technology, but most of 
the discussion will be applicable more broadly to other search engines, such as 
Bing and DuckDuckGo. The Article will use the term “search” as an abstract 
noun to describe the social practice of using keyword-based search engines. 
This social practice, even more than Google or other search engines, is the Ar-
ticle’s true subject; once it is rightly understood, the question of how to regu-
late Google becomes far clearer.  
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In December 2009, the Times ran Search, But You May Not 
Find by Adam Raff, the co-founder of the United Kingdom-
based search engine Foundem, in which he accused Google of 
slanting its search results to favor its own services.2 Raff wrote 
that Foundem “was effectively ‘disappeared’ from the Internet” 
when it was demoted in Google’s search results.3 He called on 
the government to adopt a policy of “search neutrality” and pro-
tect websites like Foundem from Google’s dominance.4 His 
charges anticipated the “search bias” issues at the heart of the 
ambitious Federal Trade Commission (FTC) antitrust investi-
gation of Google: complaints that Google unfairly favored its 
own maps and other specialized “vertical” content over others’.5
But in January 2013, just after the FTC’s investigation had 
fizzled out with a no-action letter on search bias, the Times ran 
Is Google Like Gas or Like Steel? by Bruce Brown and Alan Da-
vidson.
 
6 Google, they argued, was like the Associated Press: 
protected by the First Amendment.7 In 1945, the Supreme 
Court held that antitrust law would not “compel [the Associat-
ed Press] or its members to permit publication of anything 
which their ‘reason’ tells them should not be published.”8
 
 2. Adam Raff, Op-Ed., Search, But You May Not Find, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
28, 2009, at A27. 
 This 
same standard should apply to Google, Brown and Davidson 
argued, explaining that “search engines need to make choices 
 3. Id. A search result is “demoted” when it moves from a prominent posi-
tion to a less visible one, e.g., from the top search result on the first page of 
results to the sixth result on the twentieth page. Search rankings are de-
scribed in more detail infra Part I, and the difficulties of defining a baseline 
against which to measure alleged demotion are discussed infra Part IV. 
 4. Id. (defining search neutrality as “the principle that search engines 
should have no editorial policies other than that their results be comprehen-
sive, impartial and based solely on relevance”). 
 5. See Statement of the Fed. Trade Comm’n, In re Google Inc., No. 111-
0163 (Jan. 3, 2013). In addition to search bias, the FTC considered allegations 
that Google was copying content without permission from websites, unfairly 
making it difficult for advertisers to switch to competing search engines, and 
misusing standard-essential patents, among other issues. See generally Deci-
sion and Order, In re Motorola Mobility, No. 12-0120 (Jan. 3, 2013). In the 
end, it was this last prong that generated the strongest enforcement action. 
This Article focuses on search bias because it raises the most truly fundamen-
tal issues about what we as a society want from search engines. 
 6. See Bruce D. Brown & Alan B. Davidson, Op-Ed., Is Google Like Gas 
or Like Steel?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2013, at A17; Raff, supra note 2. 
 7. Id. (comparing the Associated Press’s concern “about a regulator in 
every newsroom” with Google’s concern “about a regulator in every algo-
rithm”). 
 8. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 n.18 (1945). 
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about what results are most relevant to a query, just as a news 
editor must decide which stories deserve to be on the front 
page.”9
These op-eds endorse two diametrically opposed theories of 
what a search engine is. To Raff, and to scholars like Jennifer 
Chandler
 
10 and Frank Pasquale,11 Google ought to be a passive 
and neutral conduit, connecting users to websites and then 
stepping out of the way. To Brown and Davidson, and to schol-
ars like Eric Goldman12 and Eugene Volokh,13
The choice between “conduit” and “editor” has decisive im-
plications for how the law should deal with Google—and it is 
more complicated than a simple “Google wins” or “Google los-
es.” On search bias claims like Foundem’s, the conduit theory is 
a recipe for regulation, while the editor theory offers a First-
Amendment get-out-of-jail-free card.
 Google instead 
ought to be an active and opinionated editor, sifting through 
the Internet and using expert judgment to identify the im-
portant and the interesting. These two theories form the rhe-
torical backdrop to the ongoing legal battles over search. 
14 But when the issue is 
defamation, the conduit theory holds Google harmless for the 
sins of the websites it unknowingly connects users to, while the 
editor theory calls down the vengeance of the heavens on 
Google for its editorial decisions.15
Indeed, not even Google itself can keep straight whether it 
is an objective conduit or a subjective editor. In 2006, respond-
ing to a search-bias lawsuit from the children’s-information 
website KinderStart, one of Google’s lawyers explained that 
“Google is constantly evaluating Web sites for standards and 
 
 
 9. Brown & Davidson, supra note 6. Brown knows more than a little 
about the press’s free speech rights: he is executive director of the Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press. Davidson—before a stint as Director of 
Public Policy for the Americas for Google—worked on free expression issues 
for the Center for Democracy and Technology. See Andrew McLaughlin, 
Google Goes to Washington, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Oct. 6, 2005), http:// 
googleblog.blogspot.com/2005/10/google-goes-to-washington.html. 
 10. Jennifer A. Chandler, A Right to Reach an Audience: An Approach to 
Intermediary Bias on the Internet, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095 (2007). 
 11. E.g., Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility, 54 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 115 (2006). 
 12. E.g., Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search En-
gine Utopianism, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 188 (2006). 
 13. Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google First Amendment Protection 
for Search Engine Search Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 883 (2012). 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. See infra Part V.C. 
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quality, which is entirely subjective.”16 But in 2012, Google 
faced a defamation lawsuit from the former “First Lady” of 
Germany, Bettina Wulff, who objected that typing [bettina 
wulff] into Google produced autocomplete search suggestions 
including [bettina wulff escort] and [bettina wulff 
prostitute].17 Google’s response: autocomplete suggestions 
are “the algorithmic result of several objective factors, including 
the popularity of search terms.”18
 
 16. Dawn Kawamoto, Suit over Poor Google Ranking May Go Forward, 
CNET NEWS (June 30, 2006, 2:59 PM), http://news.cnet.com/Suit-over-poor 
-Google-ranking-may-go-forward/2100-1025_3-6090239.html (quoting David 
Kramer) (emphasis added). This is not an isolated statement; Google has made 
it repeatedly to courts. See Kinderstart.com v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF 
(RS), 2007 WL 831806, at *20–21 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (“Google itself 
holds out PageRank as an opinion . . . .”); Langdon v. Google, Inc, 474 F. Supp. 
2d 622, 630 (D. Del. 2007) (comparing Google to newspapers that retain the 
freedom “to exercise subjective editorial discretion”); Kinderstart.com v. 
Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2006 WL 3246596, at *13–14 (N.D. Cal. 
July 13, 2006) (“Google also contends . . . PageRank cannot be anything but 
subjective.”); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 
WL 21464568, at *3–4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003) (“Google argues that 
PageRanks are subjective opinions . . . .”). Google’s Eric Schmidt has also 
claimed, in Congressional testimony, “Search is subjective, and there’s no ‘cor-
rect’ set of search results.” The Power of Google: Serving Consumers or Threat-
ening Competition?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition 
Pol’y and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 238 
(2011) (statement of Eric Schmidt, Executive Chairman, Google, Inc.) [herein-
after Schmidt Testimony]. 
 Google’s enemies are equally 
opportunistic: Google should objectively present the web as it 
 17. Stefan Niggemeier, Autocompleting Bettina Wulff: Can a Google Func-
tion Be Libelous?, DER SPIEGEL (Sept. 20, 2012, 3:45 PM) (Paul Cohen, trans.), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/google-autocomplete-former 
-german-first-lady-defamation-case-a-856820.html. In this Article, I follow the 
industry convention of placing search terms between brackets and setting 
them in a fixed-width typeface. 
 18. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting unnamed Google spokesman) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also An Explanation of Our Search Results, 
GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/explanation.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2013) 
(capturing Google’s current explanation: “The beliefs and preferences of those 
who work at Google, as well as the opinions of the general public, do not de-
termine or impact our search results”). The initial version of this statement 
was even more emphatic. An Explanation of Our Search Results, GOOGLE 
(June 7, 2004), http://web.archive.org/web/20040607132019/http://www.google 
.com/explanation.html (capturing Google’s message in 2004: “Our search re-
sults are generated completely objectively . . . . Because of our objective and 
automated ranking system, Google cannot be influenced by these petitions [to 
remove particular links or otherwise adjust search results]” (emphasis add-
ed)). 
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is, except when that would be bad, in which case Google should 
subjectively step in to fix things.19
Others have noted the tension between these two theories 
of search.
 
20
But there is another possibility. It takes two to tango, and 
three to search. In addition to the website and the search en-
gine, there is also the user. For all their differences, the conduit 
and editor theories have a common conception of search users: 
as audiences, whose only job is to consume the speech of others. 
On the conduit theory, users are eyeballs for websites; the 
search engine’s job is to get out of the way and deliver to each 
website the user traffic to which it is properly entitled. And on 
the editor theory, users are eyeballs for search engines; a dis-
satisfied user’s best and only option is to change the channel 
and try another search engine. Neither of these models fully 
captures how people use search, because search responds to us-
ers’ interests in a way that other media do not.  
 In First Amendment terms, the crucial difference is 
the identity of the relevant speaker: the conduit theory focuses 
on websites’ speech, the editor theory on search engines’ 
speech. Raff’s op-ed is an eloquent plea for Foundem’s right to 
present its views to users free from Google’s interference; 
Brown and Davidson’s op-ed is an equally eloquent plea for 
Google’s right to present its own views to users free from the 
government’s interference. Speech meets speech, with no obvi-
ous way to assign priority to one or the other. The Problem of 
Google thus presents itself as an intractable opposition between 
websites and search engines; it puts courts and regulators to a 
stark and partisan choice between two incompatible characteri-
zations of search. 
Instead of passively consuming from a fixed menu set be-
fore them, search users actively seek out information. Each 
query—[fayette monroe shooting] or [brining pheas-
ants for smoking] or [baby splotchy rash with white 
 
 19. For a good example of the kitchen-sink approach to attacking Google, 
see generally SCOTT CLELAND, SEARCH & DESTROY: WHY YOU CAN’T TRUST 
GOOGLE INC. (2011). 
 20. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles: 
Commercial Ethics for Carriers and Search Engines, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
263, 266 (questioning whether “dominant search engines” should have obliga-
tions or immunities); Danny Sullivan, KinderStart Becomes KinderStopped in 
Ranking Lawsuit Against Google, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (July 14, 2006), 
http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2058241/KinderStart-Becomes 
-KinderStopped-In-Ranking-Lawsuit-Against-Google (“So what is it, objective 
or subjective, or argue what’s most convenient . . . [?]”). 
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bumps] or [DIY subwoofer]—expresses a desire to become 
better-informed on a specific subject.21
From the user’s perspective, a search engine is not primari-
ly a conduit or an editor. Instead, it is a trusted advisor. It lis-
tens to a user’s description of her goals in the form of a search 
query, performs research on her behalf, uses its expert judg-
ment to sift through what it has learned, and reports back to 
her with recommendations on which websites to visit and 
which ones to ignore. This point of view harmonizes the conduit 
and editor theories by incorporating insights from both. A 
search engine connects websites to users and it exercises dis-
cretion in creating its results. The two functions are insepara-
ble because they are both aspects of advising search users 
about websites. 
 The queries, and the de-
sires, are as diverse as the range of human experience. The 
search results that come back are a personally customized mix 
of websites; if the process is working well, they are uniquely 
relevant to the user’s unique interests. This is profoundly good 
for individual autonomy, and the law ought to promote it. Good 
search policy would put users first. 
There are threads of the advisor theory throughout the ex-
isting debates on search. But because these debates have tradi-
tionally been understood as a series of binary choices—conduit 
or editor, objective or subjective, for Google or against it—their 
significance has been discounted. Users’ interests are present, 
but only rhetorically, as a justification for siding with websites 
or with search engines. Commentators simply assume that the 
question to be answered is whether treating search engines as 
conduits or editors is better for users in the long run. That both 
of these options might sell users short has not previously been 
suggested. 
If we are determined, as we should be, to put search users 
first, law can do two things for them. It can promote access to 
search by enabling users to draw on the aid of search engines, 
and it can promote loyalty in search by preventing search en-
gines from misleading users. Access responds to the conduit 
theory: the search engine owes nothing to websites struggling 
to be heard; what matters is the user’s ability to select among 
websites, which necessarily includes ignoring most of them 
most of the time. And loyalty responds to the editor theory: a 
search result is not a product the user consumes for its own sa-
 
 21. Except where a citation is provided, all examples of search queries in 
this Article are fictional. 
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ke; it is useful only as a way to find the websites whose speech 
the user really values.  
Access and loyalty provide fresh insights into numerous le-
gal and regulatory debates about search. Take a search bias 
claim like Foundem’s: that Google unfairly lowered its search 
ranking.22
On the advisor theory, matters are more nuanced. From 
users’ point of view, website quality is subjective; no two users 
will have quite the same preferences. You say tomato.com; I say 
tomato.org. In a search for [tomato], either result could be 
right. If we care about access, then no website ever has a right 
to insist on top placement; if it did, it would override the pref-
erences of users who are looking for something else. But if we 
care about loyalty, then Google is not yet off the hook. Search 
engines systematically measure user satisfaction with search 
results; they develop algorithms intended to return the results 
users want.
 On the conduit theory, which says that search re-
sults are objective, Foundem’s claim should succeed, as long as 
Foundem is right that its website really is better than the al-
ternatives. On the editor theory, which says that search results 
are subjective, Foundem’s claim is doomed at the outset: Google 
is categorically free to express its own opinion of websites.  
23
In fact, this is very close to the approach the FTC took 
when it dismissed the search-bias portion of its investigation. 
Google’s favoritism towards its own maps, flights, and other 
vertical content was acceptable, the Commission wrote, because 
“Google’s primary goal in introducing this content was to quick-
ly answer, and better satisfy, its users’ search queries . . . .”
 If Google shows tomato.com but knows that most 
users would have preferred to see tomato.org, it disserves users 
because it deceives them. The search results are not wrong in 
an absolute sense, but they are dishonest in the context of 
Google’s relationship to its users. 
24
 
 22. This argument is presented in more detail infra Part IV. 
 
On the conduit and editor theories, Google’s motives should 
have been irrelevant: both theories focus on conduct, one to 
condemn, the other to justify. But on the advisor theory, motive 
is crucial, because it is the intent to harm users that makes the 
ranking disloyal and thus actionable. The FTC did not explain 
why its analysis properly turned on Google’s motives; the advi-
sor theory supplies the missing explanation. 
 23. See generally Steven Levy, How Google’s Algorithm Rules the Web, 
WIRED, Mar. 2010, at 96. 
 24. Statement of the Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 5.  
  
876 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:868 
 
This Article presents, defends, and applies the advisor the-
ory of search. Part I is background. It provides a quick tech-
nical overview of how search engines work and a glossary of 
important search terminology. Part II describes the conduit 
and editor theories, showing how they embrace two fundamen-
tally incompatible visions of what search is and how to regulate 
it. Part III resolves the tension between them by introducing 
and defending the advisor theory. Part IV applies the advisor 
theory to the search bias issue at the heart of the FTC’s inves-
tigation, concluding that the FTC was probably right to drop 
the investigation without action. And Part V shows that the 
advisor theory is useful more broadly, presenting four short 
case studies of how it offers useful advice on other recurring 
problems in search law.  
I.  HOW SEARCH ENGINES WORK   
This Part briefly explains how modern search engines work 
and how they display results to users. Readers who are familiar 
with terms like “organic results” and “universal search” should 
feel free to skip ahead to Part II. 
If you type [learn spanish] into Google you will see 
something like the following: 
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In the argot of search, this is a results page created based 
on the query [learn spanish].25 This particular query con-
tains two keywords or search terms.26 The displayed portion of 
the results page shows three organic links and two sets of spon-
sored links (or search ads).27 Each of the results consists of a 
link back to the website (underlined in blue), a text version of 
the website’s online address (in green), and two lines of text ex-
cerpted from the website or supplied by it (in black). For image 
searches, the excerpt is a thumbnail of the image; for books it is 
an eighth-of-a-page snippet; a video is usually represented by a 
single frame. The ordinal position of a result is called its rank-
ing.28
The organic results are generated through a three-step 
process.
 
29 First, Google’s computers crawl webpages and other 
sources to learn about what information they contain and how 
they link to each other.30 Second, Google uses complex and 
time-consuming algorithms to analyze the pages and their rela-
tionships.31 These estimates are based on hundreds of signals 
that assess pages’ importance and their relevance to particular 
search terms.32 Examples of signals include whether a website 
is commercial or educational, how recently a webpage was up-
dated, and whether a letter followed by a period might be a 
middle initial.33 The third step comes in response to the user’s 
query: Google consults its tables of signals, identifies those 
webpages that score highly for the query, and then displays 
them in descending order of relevance.34
 
 25. See Levy, supra note 
 All of this is complete-
23 (explaining queries). See generally JOHN 
BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: HOW GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES 
OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE (2005) (giving history of web 
search); STEVEN LEVY, IN THE PLEX: HOW GOOGLE THINKS, WORKS, AND 
SHAPES OUR LIVES (2011) (bringing history up to date through 2011). 
 26. See Levy, supra note 23. 
 27. See Grimmelmann, supra note 1, at 23. 
 28. See Pasquale, supra note 11. Confusingly, a “top” ranking means visu-
ally near the top of the first page of results, and a “low” ranking is anything 
else—but it is actually the “low” rankings that have numerically greater ordi-
nal rank when the results are ordered “first,” “second,” and so on. 
 29. See BATTELLE, supra note 25, at 20. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 22. 
 32. Levy, supra note 23. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. 
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ly standard for modern search engines; only the specific signals 
differentiate one search engine from another.35
Traditionally, there were two types of search engines.
 
36 
“General” search engines indexed the entire web; “vertical” 
search engines narrowed their focus to a specific type of con-
tent, such as movies,37 hotel bookings,38 African-American 
themes,39 or product comparisons.40 Google initially expanded 
into vertical search with specialized local search, news search, 
and image search, each with its own URL.41 In May 2007, the 
company took an important step to break down these distinc-
tions. It launched Universal Search, which “blend[ed] content 
from Images, Maps, Books, Video, and News into [Google’s] web 
results.”42
 
 Here is an example showing a restaurant-themed 
search for [hamburgers in topeka ks]. The top three re-
sults are standard general web results from the third-party 
websites Urbanspoon and Topeka.net. But they are followed by 
local search results from Google’s vertical local-search engine, 
and to the right of the main column is a map from Google Maps 
showing the locations of those restaurants. 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Statement of the Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 5 (“General pur-
pose search engines are distinct from ‘vertical’ search engines, which focus on 
narrowly defined categories of content such as shopping or travel.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Advanced Search, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/search/ (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2013). 
 38. See, e.g., HOTELS.COM, http://www.hotels.com (last visited Nov. 27, 
2013). 
 39. See, e.g., AFROROOTS, http://www.afroroots.com (last visited Nov. 27, 
2013). 
 40. See, e.g., PRICEGRABBER, http://www.pricegrabber.com (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2013). 
 41. See, e.g., News, GOOGLE, http://news.google.com (last visited Nov. 27, 
2013). 
 42. See Marissa Mayer, Universal Search: The Best Answer Is Still the 
Best Answer, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (May 16, 2007), http://googleblog 
.blogspot.com/2007/05/universal-search-best-answer-is-still.html (publicizing 
release of Google’s universal search). 
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Google is hardly alone in starting down this road. Mi-
crosoft’s Bing, for example, has many of the same categories of 
vertical results as Google does. But Google’s powerful posi-
tion—it has 67% of the United States search market43 and up-
wards of 90% in some European countries44
II.  THE CONDUIT AND EDITOR THEORIES   
—has given its move 
to universal search a special urgency. 
Everyone claims to have users’ interests at heart, and yet 
the pro- and anti-Google camps are at loggerheads over how 
best to help them. The explanation is the powerful gravitation-
al pull of the conduit and editor theories of search. Commenta-
tors who start off talking about what would be best for users 
find themselves drawn—often without even realizing it—to one 
of these decidedly non-user-centric theories of search. To un-
derstand what a truly user-centric theory of search would look 
like, therefore, it is necessary to start by bringing out the im-
plicit assumptions made by these other theories. 
The plan of this Part is simple: Section A presents the con-
duit theory and Section B the editor theory. Section C then 
 
 43. See ComScore Releases January 2013 U.S. Search Engine Rankings, 
COMSCORE (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press_Releases/ 
2013/2/comScore_Releases_January_2013_U.S._Search_Engine_Rankings. 
 44. Paul Geitner, Google Moves Toward Settlement of European Antitrust 
Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2012, at B3. 
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highlights three important and interesting contrasts between 
the two. 
A. THE CONDUIT THEORY 
When you write about search, you get the most interesting 
emails. For example: 
On a contingency fees Basis, I want to sue Google, who, using its 
dominant position (and through Googlebot actions, 
regularly registered on my Web Sitemeter) censors, constantly, de-
liberately and vigorously, Texts and Images of my (un-harmful) Web-
site . . . as it can be easily proved.45
This brief plea for help is the conduit theory in a nutshell: the 
law should prevent Google from using its “dominant position” 
to “censor” websites.  
 
Websites and their Google nightmares are at the heart of 
the conduit theory. Sometimes, the harms are economic: the 
French legal search engine eJustice lost customers and adver-
tising revenue after being demoted in Google’s rankings; it sued 
for €295 million.46 But there are just as many stories in which 
speech is at stake; Christopher Langdon sued Google for refus-
ing to let him advertise his websites NCJusticeFraud.com and 
ChinaIsEvil.com.47
The scholars who sympathize with these websites draw on 
the well-established tradition in free-speech theory that speak-
ers should have an affirmative right of access to the mass me-
dia.
 
48 They argue that speakers can effectively reach the public 
only with the media’s help; where that help is withheld, the re-
sult is private censorship.49 Telecommunications law’s long his-
tory of nondiscrimination rules,50
 
 45. Email to James Grimmelmann (Jan. 26, 2013) (on file with author).  
 from the treatment of tele-
 46. See INITIATIVE FOR A COMPETITIVE ONLINE MARKETPLACE, GOOGLE 
UNDER THE ANTITRUST MICROSCOPE 12–13 (2011), available at http://ec 
.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/pillar.cfm. 
 47. See Langdon v. Google Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d. 622, 626 (D. Del. 2007). 
 48. The urtext for this tradition is Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—
A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967). For modern 
commentary on the tradition, see generally Marjorie Heins & Eric M. Freed-
man, Reclaiming the First Amendment: Constitutional Theories of Media Re-
form, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 917 (2007) (symposium issue on the 40th anniver-
sary of Barron’s original article); Symposium, Access to the Media: 1967 to 
2007 and Beyond: A Symposium Honoring Jerome A. Barron’s Path-Breaking 
Article, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 819 (2008) (same).  
 49. See Jack M. Balkin, Media Access: A Question of Design, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 933, 935 (2008). 
 50. See generally Daniel A. Lyons, Net Neutrality and Nondiscrimination 
Norms in Telecommunications, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 1029 (2012); Tim Wu, Why 
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phone and telegraph as common carriers51 to the recent push 
for network neutrality,52 embody this philosophy. So did right-
of-reply statutes53 and the Federal Communications Commis-
sion’s late fairness doctrine,54 both of which compelled mass 
media to present opposing viewpoints.55 In each case, the medi-
um is regarded as a conduit: it exists to carry the speech of oth-
ers.56
With the rise of the Internet and of Google, scholars have 
extended this argument to search engines.
 
57 The argument re-
quires one significant modification, because search engines are 
not “means of speech”58 like printing presses or cable networks. 
Instead, they are “selection intermediaries”59 that direct users 
to one information provider or another.60 Because of their role, 
they have immense power to choose which speakers are found 
and which speakers are sent “to the back row of the arena.”61
 
Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in Communica-
tions, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15 (2006). 
 
 51. See 47 U.S.C. § 202 (2006) (prohibiting “any unjust or unreasonable 
discrimination” by common carriers). 
 52. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, REPORT AND ORDER: PRESERVING THE 
FREE AND OPEN INTERNET, No. 10-201 (2010). 
 53. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 244 (1974) (de-
scribing Florida’s right-of-reply statute). 
 54. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 373–86 (1969) (describ-
ing history of fairness doctrine). 
 55. See generally Television Assignments, 41 F.C.C. 148, 158–67 (1952) 
(reserving television channels for educational broadcasting); Turner Broad. 
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (upholding statute requiring cable oper-
ators to carry certain local broadcast television stations). 
 56. See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission?: Ac-
cess, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
1149, 1199 (2008) (“[S]earch engine rankings play a central instrumental role 
in facilitating effective speech by others.”); Emily B. Laidlaw, Private Power, 
Public Interest: An Examination of Search Engine Accountability, 17 J.L. INFO 
& TECH. 113, 122 (2008) (“The media’s core role is to publish.”); see also Note, 
Against Search Engine Volition, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 205, 223 (2008) 
(“[T]he search engine’s effective function is to serve as a conduit between third 
parties.”).  
 57. See, e.g., Lucas D. Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web: 
Why the Politics of Search Engines Matter, 16 INFO. SOC’Y 169, 169–70 (2000) 
(drawing parallels between debates about other media and search engines on 
the Internet). 
 58. Chandler, supra note 10, at 1097. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Laidlaw, supra note 56, at 123–26. 
 61. Jonathan Rosenberg, From the Height of This Place, GOOGLE OFFICIAL 
BLOG (Feb. 16, 2009), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/02/from-height-of 
-this-place.html. For further examples of this discourse, see, e.g., Niva Elkin-
Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the Right to Ex-
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Since search engines have the same practical power as tradi-
tional mass media to shape public discourse, goes the argu-
ment, they should be subject to the same scrutiny and perhaps 
to the same regulations.62 Some scholars have argued that web-
sites should have an affirmative right to be included in search 
engine indices.63 Most recently, some observers have proposed 
“search neutrality” rules by analogy to network neutrality.64 
They all agree that the legal system should ensure that a di-
verse array of information providers can be found through 
search engines65—that the search engine is a conduit for their 
ideas.66
 
clude Indexing, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 179, 183 (2001) (“[F]ocal point of control 
. . . .”); Editorial, The Google Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010, at A30 
(“[T]hey can break the business of a Web site that is pushed down the rank-
ings.”). 
 
 62. See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 61, at 184 (comparing Internet users 
to television viewers); Laidlaw, supra note 56, at 123–37 (“Within the regula-
tory models in traditional media, the Internet adopts some of all three func-
tions.”). But see, e.g., Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 56, at 1157 (“Internet 
communication does not possess the characteristics that supported broad regu-
lation of broadcast media.”). 
 63. Pasquale, supra note 11, at 135–36 (2006) (proposing right of reply to 
harmful search results with asterisk); see, e.g., DAWN NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL 
FREEDOM 14–17, 149–51 (2009); Chandler, supra note 10, at 1117–25; Dawn 
Nunziato, Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 BERK. TECH. L.J. 1115, 
1123–25 (2005). But see James Grimmelmann, Don’t Censor Search, 117 YALE 
L.J. POCKET PART 48 (2007), http://Yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/ 
582.pdf (critiquing asterisk); Frank Pasquale, Asterisk Revisited: Debating a 
Right of Reply on Search Results, 3 J. BUS & TECH. L. 61 (2008) (defending as-
terisk). 
 64. Nate Anderson, Search Neutrality? How Google Became a Neutrality 
Target, ARS TECHNICA (Apr 29, 2010, 9:32 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech 
-policy/2010/04/search-neutrality-google-becomes-neutraliy/ (describing history 
of idea); see also John Blevins, The New Scarcity: A First Amendment Frame-
work for Regulating Access to Digital Media Platforms, 79 TENN. L. REV. 353 
(2012); Jeremy Jarosch, Novel “Neutrality” Claims Against Internet Platforms: 
A Reasonable Framework for Initial Scrutiny, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 537 (2011); 
Andrew Odlyzko, Network Neutrality, Search Neutrality, and the Never-
Ending Conflict Between Efficiency and Fairness in Markets, 8 REV. NETWORK 
ECON. 40 (2009); Raff, supra note 2. The Foundem-founded website 
SearchNeutrality.org offers a useful roundup of links and commentary on the 
pro-search-neutrality side. SEARCHNEUTRALITY.ORG: A FOUNDEM INITIATIVE, 
http://www.searchneutrality.org (last visited Nov. 27, 2013). For a contrasting 
point of view, see James Grimmelmann, Some Skepticism About Search Neu-
trality, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTER-
NET 435–47 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds., 2010). 
 65. Most ambitiously, some commentators proposed randomization, in 
which sites would be randomly promoted in search engine rankings. See, e.g., 
Sandeep Pandey et al., Shuffling a Stacked Deck: The Case for Partially Ran-
domized Ranking of Search Results, PROC. 31ST CONF. ON VERY LARGE DATA-
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Three recurring metaphors illustrate how the conduit theo-
ry thinks about search: “‘maps,’” ‘“traffic,’” and ‘“bias.’” Scholars 
who say that search engines “create a map of the Web”67 or that 
Google is “the main map to the information highway”68 appeal 
to an ideal of accuracy and objectivity.69 Oren Bracha and 
Frank Pasquale propose that search results be treated like 
maps, and the intuitive justification is simple.70 A good map 
shouldn’t say that there’s a bridge where there isn’t one in real 
life.71
The related traffic metaphor is even sharper. Saying that a 
search engine delivers “traffic”
 
72 to websites implies that search 
is a kind of transportation infrastructure.73 When Google “di-
vert[s] traffic,” the metaphor suggests an unwanted detour, like 
orange cones forcing users off the highway at the Google exit.74
 
BASES (2005), available at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~spandey/publications/ 
randomRanking-vldb.pdf.  
 
 66. See, e.g., Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 56, at 1192 (“[S]earch engines 
. . . portray[] themselves as passive conduits.”); Laidlaw, supra note 56, at 124 
(“[S]earch engines are now the portals through which the information on the 
Internet is experienced.”). 
 67. Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 57, at 171. 
 68. The Google Algorithm, supra note 61. 
 69. See Grimmelmann, supra note 1, at 31–33. 
 70. Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 56, at 1194 n.238. The authors also 
compare search results to directory listings, concluding, “It is hard to conceive 
of a phone book as embodying any constitutionally protected message.” Id. 
 71. Of course, maps can be inaccurate and intensely political; there are 
sometimes sharp controversies over what maps do and do not show. See gener-
ally MARK MONMONIER, HOW TO LIE WITH MAPS (2d ed. 1996). Google has had 
a few unfortunate encounters with this phenomenon. See Frank Jacobs, The 
First Google Maps War, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Feb. 28, 2012, 12:30 PM), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/28/the-first-google-maps-war/ 
(discussing tension between Nicaragua and Costa Rica over incorrect Google 
Maps depiction of disputed frontier territory); see also Rosenberg v. Harwood, 
No. 100916536, 2011 BL 333199, at *4–5 (Utah Dist. Ct. May 27, 2011) (hold-
ing that Google owed no duty to warn Google Maps user that highway lacked 
sidewalks); infra Part IV.B (discussing tort liability for publishers of inaccu-
rate maps). 
 72. See, e.g., CONSUMER WATCHDOG, TRAFFIC REPORT: HOW GOOGLE IS 
SQUEEZING OUT COMPETITORS AND MUSCLING INTO NEW MARKETS 15 (2010); 
INITIATIVES FOR A COMPETITIVE MARKET, supra note 46, at 8. 
 73. Cf. BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE VALUE OF SHARED 
SOCIAL RESOURCES 359–60 (2012) (discussing Google Books corpus and set-
tlement as possible infrastructural resources). 
 74. See Alex Barker, Antitrust Chief Holds All the Aces, FIN. TIMES (Lon-
don), Jan. 11, 2013, at 17 (quoting Joaquín Almunia, European Commissioner 
for Competition); see also, e.g., ADAM RAFF & SHIVAUN RAFF, PENALTIES, 
SELF-PREFERENCING, AND PANDA 1 (2011) (“Google can exploit its gatekeeper 
status to commandeer a substantial proportion of the traffic of almost any 
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It also downplays any speech element in search; driving is a 
form of conduct, not communication.75 As Bracha and Pasquale 
put it, “[r]ankings are functional rather than dialogical expres-
sions.”76
The bias metaphor describes what happens when search 
engines fall short of this ideal.
 
77 Friedman and Nissenbaum de-
fine “biased” computer systems as ones that “systematically and 
unfairly discriminate against certain individuals or groups of 
individuals in favor of others.”78 As applied to search engines, 
the idea is that an engine may skew its results in a way that 
imposes its own viewpoint on users.79 These biases could be 
large and subtle—towards commercial content or popular 
sites80
 
website or industry sector it chooses.”); Grimmelmann, supra note 
—or they could be specific and targeted to advance the 
1, at 27–30. 
 75. Cf. Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 56, at 1197 (comparing search re-
sult to seller offering “three alternative products in response to a buyer’s in-
quiry”). 
 76. Id. at 1198. 
 77. The metaphor is pervasive in academic critiques of Google. For exam-
ples of papers that use the metaphor in the title, see Benjamin Edelman, Bias 
in Search Results? Diagnosis and Response, 7 INDIAN J.L. & TECH. 16 (2011); 
Goldman, supra note 12; Joshua G. Hazan, Stop Being Evil: A Proposal for 
Unbiased Google Search, 111 MICH. L. REV. 789 (2013); Introna & 
Nissenbaum, supra note 57; Alejandro Diaz, Through the Google Goggles: So-
ciopolitical Bias in Search Engine Design (May 2005) (unpublished under-
graduate thesis, Stanford University), available at http://epl.scu.edu/~ 
stsvalues/readings/diaz_thesis_final.pdf. 
The most remarkable—and embarrassing for Google—use of the term 
must be by Google’s founders. See SERGEY BRIN & LAWRENCE PAGE, THE 
ANATOMY OF A LARGE-SCALE HYPTERTEXTUAL WEB SEARCH ENGINE app. A 
(1998), available at http://ilpubs.stanford.edu:8090/361/1/1998-8.pdf (“Since it 
is very difficult even for experts to evaluate search engines, search engine bias 
is particularly insidious.”). Related metaphors get at the idea of unfairness by 
treating search as a game. See The Power of Google: Serving Consumers or 
Threatening Competition?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Compe-
tition Policy, & Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. 28 (2011) (testimony of Jeremy Stoppelman, CEO, Yelp! Inc.) [hereinaf-
ter Stoppelman Testimony]; Jeffrey Katz, Op-Ed., Google’s Monopoly and In-
ternet Freedom, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2012, at A15, available at http://online 
.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303830204577448792246251470 
(stating that Google has “stacked the deck”).  
 78. Batya Friedman & Helen Nissenbaum, Bias in Computer Systems, 14 
ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. SYS. 330, 332 (1996). 
 79. See, Chandler, supra note 10, at 1103; James Grimmelmann, Infor-
mation Policy for the Library of Babel, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 29, 39 (2008) 
(“Search engines can play favorites.”); Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 57, 
at 176 (“skewed”). 
 80. Cf. Urs Gasser, Regulating Search Engines: Taking Stock and Looking 
Ahead, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH 201, 228–29 (2006) (discussing “diversity” of in-
formation sources as a policy goal for search). See generally MATTHEW 
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search engine’s own commercial interests.81 But whatever form 
it takes, bias is bad.82
B. THE EDITOR THEORY 
 
Some of Google’s defenders have a surprising response to 
search bias: they embrace it. Blogger Mike Masnick writes, 
“[T]here’s no such thing as ‘neutrality’ in search, because any 
ranking is biased by what the search engine thinks is best.”83
Search engines are media companies. Like other media companies, 
search engines make editorial choices designed to satisfy their audi-
ence. These choices systematically favor certain types of content over 
others, producing a phenomenon called “search engine bias.” 
 Or, 
as Eric Goldman argues: 
  Search engine bias sounds scary, but . . . such bias is both neces-
sary and desirable.84
And that’s the editor theory in a nutshell: search engines are 
“media companies” that make “editorial choices” about what to 
publish. 
 
In the words of a Google engineer, “In some sense when 
people come to Google, that’s exactly what they’re asking for—
our editorial judgment.”85 Editor theorists agree that search re-
sults are “editorial judgments” about which websites might be 
of interest to users.86
 
HINDMAN, THE MYTH OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY 54–57 (2009) (discussing 
“Googelearchy” in which popular sites become even more popular); Laidlaw, 
supra note 
 Search engines are editors that pick and 
56, at 129; Diaz, supra note 77, at 62–94.  
 81. See generally Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 56, at 1170; Edelman, 
supra note 77, at 19 (describing informal experiment to show pro-network 
neutrality bias in search results of network neutrality supporter Google); 
Friedman & Nissenbaum, supra note 78, at 330–31 (describing biases in com-
puterized reservation systems favoring the systems’ airline owners). 
 82. See BEUC, FAIR INTERNET SEARCH: REMEDIES IN GOOGLE CASE 5 
(2013), available at http://www.beuc.org/custom/2013-00211-01-E.pdf (“Google 
must use an objective, non-discriminatory mechanism to rank and display all 
search results, including any links to Google products.”). 
 83. Mike Masnick, A Recommendation Is Not the Same as Corruption, 
TECHDIRT (June 21, 2010, 8:07 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/ 
20100621/0355239887.shtml. 
 84. Goldman, supra note 12, at 189; see also Christopher S. Yoo, Free 
Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an Unintermediated Experience, 78 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697, 708 (2010) (“It is thus hard to see how to make sense 
of criticisms that search engine results are ‘biased’ when bias is the very es-
sence of the enterprise.”). 
 85. Steven Levy, TED 2011: The ‘Panda’ That Hates Farms: A Q&A with 
Google’s Top Search Engineers, WIRED NEWS (Mar. 3, 2011, 1:36 PM), http:// 
www.wired.com/business/2011/03/the-panda-that-hates-farms/all/. 
 86. See Eric Goldman, Revisiting Search Engine Bias, 38 WM. MITCHELL 
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choose among preexisting materials to generate a new presen-
tation.87 Making the necessary choices requires the exercise of 
discretion and judgment.88 Google even holds a patent on a 
“[s]ystem and method for supporting editorial opinion in the 
ranking of search results.”89
The editor theory has its own long and distinguished tradi-
tion in free speech law and theory.
 
90 The press is so central to 
the First Amendment that it is called out by name; the United 
States Reports are stuffed with encomia to the democratic con-
tributions of editors and publishers.91
Exhibit A for the editor theory is an analogy between 
Google and newspapers, most often the New York Times.
 Editors must be free to 
select and present unpopular and controversial viewpoints; the 
government is forbidden to interfere with their exercise of pro-
fessional judgment. 
92
 
L. REV. 96, 106 (2011) (“editorial discretion”); Goldman, supra note 
 In 
12, at 189 
(“editorial choices”); id. at 190 (“editorial judgments”); Volokh & Falk, supra 
note 13, passim; Brown & Davidson, supra note 6 (“editorial judgment”); Dan-
ny Sullivan, The New York Times Algorithm & Why It Needs Government Reg-
ulation, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Jul. 15, 2010, 2:07 PM), http:// 
searchengineland.com/regulating-the-new-york-times-46521 (“editorial judg-
ment”).  
 87. See, e.g., Volokh & Falk, supra note 13, at 890 (“[Search results] are 
collections of facts that are organized and sorted using the judgment embodied 
in the engines’ algorithms . . . .”); cf. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A ‘compilation’ is 
a [copyrightable] work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting 
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way 
that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of author-
ship.”). 
 88. See Volokh & Falk, supra note 13, at 891 (“The First Amendment pro-
tects the decisions to include or exclude others’ content, based on the speakers’ 
exercise of their judgment . . . .”). 
 89. U.S. Patent No. 7,096,214 (filed Dec. 13, 2000).  
 90. See, e.g., Randall Bezanson, The Developing Law of Editorial Judg-
ment, 78 NEB. L. REV. 754, 756 (1999) (reviewing role of press in free speech 
doctrine and theory, with particular focus on “the press’s central instrument, 
editorial judgment, and its main claim to constitutional protection, editorial 
freedom”). 
 91. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 832 (1972) (“The constitutional 
guarantee of a free press assures the maintenance of our political system and 
an open society and secures the paramount public interest in a free flow of in-
formation to the people concerning public officials.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1944) (“That 
Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of 
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of 
the public, that a free press is a condition of a free society.”). 
 92. See Schmidt Testimony, supra note 16 (“Just as a government panel 
could not dictate to the New York Times, the Drudge Report, or the Huffington 
Post what stories they could publish on their websites without infringing their 
  
2014] SPEECH ENGINES 887 
 
response to a Times editorial calling for greater scrutiny of 
Google’s search results,93 search industry analyst Danny Sulli-
van wrote a scathing response turning the editorial’s argu-
ments back on the newspaper.94 “When the New York Times ed-
itorial staff tweaks its supersecret algorithm behind what to 
cover and exactly how to cover a story—as it does hundreds of 
times a day—it can break a business that is pushed down in 
coverage or not covered at all.”95 The argument for regulating 
the Times’ editorial meetings is meant to be absurd, and there-
by to illustrate the absurdity of the Times’ argument for regu-
lating search rankings.96
A second characteristic trope of the editor theory is that 
search is hard. Commentators and advocates describe the diffi-
culty of the search ranking process: the unfathomable number 
of webpages Google indexes,
  
97 the number of distinct signals on 
which it relies,98 the number of changes it makes a year,99 the 
extensive work that goes into assessing and improving the re-
sults.100
 
freedom of speech, so too would government-mandated results likely violate 
Google’s freedom of speech.”); Goldman, supra note 
 These points are directed to showing that regulation of 
12, at 189 (“Search engines 
are media companies.”); Volokh & Falk, supra note 13, at 884–85 (comparing 
search engines to newspapers); id. at 888 (“[S]earch engine companies are 
rightly seen as media enterprises, much as the New York Times Company or 
CNN are media enterprises.”); Brown & Davidson, supra note 6 (“But search 
engines need to make choices about what results are most relevant to a query, 
just as a news editor must decide which stories deserve to be on the front 
page.”); Sullivan, supra note 86; cf. Chandler, supra note 10, at 1126–29 (ac-
knowledging similarity between selection intermediaries and newspapers but 
arguing for constitutionality of transparency and anti-blocking rules). 
 93. The Google Algorithm, supra note 61. 
 94. Sullivan, supra note 86. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (“Suffice to say, the editorial staff of the New York Times would 
scream bloody murder if anyone suggested government oversight of its own 
editorial processes.”). 
 97. See James Grimmelmann, The Google Dilemma, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 939, 940 (2009); Volokh & Falk, supra note 13, at 891 (“Search engines 
are vastly more selective . . . .”). 
 98. See, e.g., Schmidt Testimony, supra note 16. See generally Levy, supra 
note 23 (describing signals). 
 99. Schmidt Testimony, supra note 16. For examples, see Pandu Nayak, 
Search Quality Highlights: 65 Changes for August and September, GOOGLE 
INSIDE SEARCH (Oct. 4, 2012, 9:12 AM), http://insidesearch.blogspot.com/2012/ 
10/search-quality-highlights-65-changes.html (listing 65 algorithmic changes 
in 61 days). 
 100. See, e.g., Marissa Mayer, Do Not Neutralize the Web’s Endless Search, 
FIN. TIMES (London) (July 15, 2010, 11:19 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/ 
0/0458b1a4-8f78-11df-8df0-00144feab49a.html#axzz2hj5r3qgT (“Yet searching 
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search results would be futile,101 but they are also intended to 
demonstrate the human judgment involved.102 In March 2012, 
Google released a video of a short segment of its weekly search 
quality meeting, showing its engineers spending eight minutes 
debating, with extensive empirical data, how to choose which 
words to spell-check in long search queries.103
A final trope of the editor theory is innovation in search 
technology. Search has progressed far beyond the “ten blue 
links” of a decade ago to a paradigm of universal search incor-
porating structured vertical results.
 The resemblance 
to a newspaper editorial meeting cannot have been lost on 
Google’s public-relations team. 
104 One point of emphasiz-
ing this evolution is to argue that Google’s changes reflect in-
dustry-wide advances in how results are organized and 
presented to users, not nefarious motives unique to Google.105 
Another reason is to demonstrate the existence of vigorous 
competition in the industry, so that Google can defend its posi-
tion only through vigorous innovation in improving search.106 
And a third is to argue that any regulation of search results 
would inhibit future advances.107
 
the web has never been more complex.”). 
 All of these arguments take a 
romantic view of the search engineer: he (or she, but usually 
 101. See, e.g., Marvin Ammori & Luke Pelican, Competitors’ Proposed Rem-
edies for Search Bias: Search “Neutrality” and Other Proposals, 15 J. INTER-
NET L., May 2012, at 1, 14–15. 
 102. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 12, at 190; Volokh & Falk, supra note 
13, at 888 (“[T]he computer algorithms that produce search engine output are 
written by humans.”). 
 103. Google, Search Quality Meeting: Spelling for Long Queries (Annotat-
ed), YOUTUBE (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?&v= 
JtRJXnXgE-A; see also Schmidt Testimony, supra note 16, at 3. 
 104. See Goldman, Revisiting Search Engine Bias, supra note 86, at 102–
05. “Ten blue links” is an informal search-engine industry term that refers to 
the sparse look of a circa-2000 search engine results page: ten results, each 
with a hyperlink in blue, and some descriptive text under each. See generally 
Romy Kohavi, Ten Blue Links No More: Dynamic Page Sizing, BING BLOGS 
(Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.bing.com/blogs/site_blogs/b/searchquality/archive/ 
2013/04/24/ten-blue-links-no-more-dynamic-page-sizing.aspx (describing the 
ten blue links and the decreasing utility of such a format). The term’s empha-
sis is on what it excludes: images, maps, oneboxes, and other ways of present-
ing information. Id. 
 105. See, e.g., Ammori & Pelican, supra note 101, at 10–11. 
 106. See Schmidt Testimony, supra note 16, at 3–4; cf. Sullivan, supra note 
86 (describing Yahoo!’s fall from dominance of the web). 
 107. See, e.g., Ammori & Pelican, supra note 101, at 19–20; Goldman, su-
pra note 12, at 197–98; Grimmelmann, supra note 63, at 50; Mayer, supra 
note 100. 
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he) is a creative technical genius whose talents society should 
harness by respecting his freedom to innovate.108
C. THREE POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT 
 
The most fundamental difference between the conduit and 
editor theories is the way they think about speech. The conduit 
theory focuses on what search does; the editor theory on what 
search says. On the conduit theory, a search engine is a medi-
um, and as a medium it has little or no speech interest of its 
own. It exists to help speakers reach audiences and the gov-
ernment should regulate it to that end. Conduit theorists argue 
that the “expressive element [in search rankings] is overwhelm-
ingly minor and incidental.”109 Regulation to ensure that a 
search engine provides access to speech by websites would not 
interfere with any valuable speech by the search engine.110
In sharp contrast, editor theorists focus not on websites’ 
speech, but on the search engine’s own speech. Take the news-
paper analogy. Newspapers show that editing is speaking, so if 
the Times and other newspapers are fully protected by the First 
Amendment, Google is too.
 
111 The point is that the search en-
gine is cogitating and communicating in ways that entitle it, 
normatively and legally, to the protections of free speech. 
Search engines are speakers.112
A second, related point of disagreement is that perennial 
chestnut of search policy: whether search results are objective 
or subjective. On the conduit theory, search results are, or 
should be, objective. The assumption of the map metaphor is 
that there is an underlying geography of information; an ideal 
presentation would represent that geography with as little dis-
tortion as possible.
 
113
 
 108. Cf. Susan P. Crawford, Network Rules, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 
53–54 (describing the rhetorical figure of the “romantic builder” who must be 
free from governmental regulation to develop advanced communications net-
works). 
 A claim of bias implies the possibility of 
 109. Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 56, at 1193. 
 110. Id. at 1192; Chandler, supra note 10, at 1129.  
 111. Volokh & Falk, supra note 13, at 884; see also Langdon v. Google, 474 
F. Supp. 2d 622, 629–30 (D. Del. 2007); cf. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Les-
bian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 570 (1995) (“[A]n edited compilation of 
speech generated by other persons is a staple of most newspapers’ opinion 
pages . . . .”).  
 112. See Volokh & Falk, supra note 13, at 884. But see Grimmelmann, su-
pra note 63, at 50 (“Search engines aren’t megaphones . . . .”). 
 113. See, e.g., Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 57, at 172–73 (critiquing 
assumption that particular technical processes used by search engines “are a 
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its absence.114 Search engine bias is deviation from an objective 
ideal.115 Conduit theorists have turned Google’s own words 
against it to argue that search is objective and impersonal.116 
They have particularly emphasized Google’s eagerness to dis-
claim legal responsibility for the information it links to and ex-
cerpts, presenting itself as a passive intermediary rather than 
the source of that information.117
On the editor theory, search results are inherently subjec-
tive because they express a search engine’s “opinion” about 
websites.
 
118 Where the conduit theory sees search rankings as 
mechanical and objective, the editor theory describes them as 
human and subjective, always uncertain and subject to de-
bate.119 Instead of decrying “bias,” the editor theory celebrates 
it. Eric Goldman calls it “the unavoidable consequence of 
search engines’ editorial control over their databases.”120
 
reliable indication of importance or relevance”). 
 Others 
go further, arguing that “bias” is a valuable expression of the 
 114. Stoppelman Testimony, supra note 77, at 37 (“Google artificially pro-
motes its own properties regardless of merit.” (emphasis added)); Chandler, 
supra note 10, at 1105 (“The key opportunity presented by the Internet is un-
filtered and essentially unbiased access to a vast quantity of speech”); Katz, 
supra note 77 (“Google should provide consumers with access to the unbiased 
search results it was once known for . . . .”). 
 115. See generally Edelman, supra note 77, at 21–23 (discussing construc-
tion of objective baseline for measuring bias). But see Joshua D. Wright, Defin-
ing and Measuring Search Bias: Some Preliminary Evidence (Geo. Mason L. & 
Econ., Working Paper No. 12-14, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2004649 (disputing Edelman’s methodology); cf. 
Adam Raff & Shivaun Raff, Would the Real Search Neutrality Please Stand 
Up, ORGZINE (May 30, 2012), http://zine.openrightsgroup.org/features/2012/ 
would-the-real-search-neutrality-please-stand-up (acknowledging that there is 
no “right” answer to many searches but arguing that “any genuine pursuit of 
the most relevant results must, by definition, preclude any form of arbitrary 
discrimination.”). 
 116. Introna and Nissenbaum discuss and critique Yahoo!’s self-
presentations. Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 57, at 172. For a general 
discussion of the rhetoric used by search engineers, see Elizabeth Van 
Couvering, Is Relevance Relevant? Market, Science, and War: Discourses of 
Search Engine Quality, 12 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 866, 879 (2007). 
 117. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 56, at 1192; Richard Siklos, A 
Struggle Over Dominance and Definition, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2006, at B5 
(quoting David Eun, a Google vice president, as saying, “I would say we’re a 
conduit connecting our users with content and advertisers”). 
 118. Ammori & Pelican, supra note 101, at 17. For more extensive discus-
sion of the status of search results as opinions, see infra Part IV. 
 119. Volokh & Falk, supra note 13, at 884–85; Goldman, Search Engine Bi-
as, supra note 12, at 191 n.15; Ammori & Pelican, supra note 101 at 13, 19; 
Mayer, supra note 100; Grimmelmann, supra note 64, at 443–44. 
 120. Goldman, supra note 12, at 195. 
  
2014] SPEECH ENGINES 891 
 
search engine’s own valuable opinions about content.121 For 
them, neutrality is neither possible nor desirable.122
A third point of disagreement is also revealing: competi-
tion. Conduit theorists describe the search market as concen-
trated and hard to break into,
 
123 so that Google in particular 
has substantial market power.124 Most Internet users find in-
formation through search engines.125 Search users are over-
whelmingly likely to follow links on the first page of results and 
overwhelmingly more likely to follow links near the top of that 
page.126 The result is that search engines are therefore “gate-
keepers” or “bottlenecks” on the Internet,127 so that websites are 
utterly dependent on search engines.128
 
 121. Volokh & Falk, supra note 
 A website that drops in 
13, at 893. 
 122. Id. (“[S]ome hypothetical and undefined expectations of abstract objec-
tivity.”); Goldman, supra note 12, at 195 (“[S]earch engines simply cannot pas-
sively and neutrally redistribute third party content.”). Goldman, supra note 
86, at 107 (“[N]eutral search engines . . . are entirely mythical.”). 
 123. INITIATIVE FOR A COMPETITIVE ONLINE MARKETPLACE, supra note 46, 
at 30–31; Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 56, at 1180–86. See generally 
FAIRSEARCH, FAIRSEARCH FACT SHEET: GOOGLE’S CONDUCT THREATENS CON-
SUMERS AND INNOVATION (2013), available at http://www.fairsearch.org/wp 
-content/uploads/2011/06/Draft-Core-FairSearch-Fact-Sheet-051812.pdf (col-
lecting sources). 
 124. See, e.g., Mark R. Patterson, Google and Search Engine Market Power, 
2013 HARV. J. L. & TECH. OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 1, 23 (2013). 
 125. See Laidlaw, supra note 56, at 126 (search engines are “indispensi-
ble”). 
 126. See Bernard J. Jansen et al., Determining the Informational, Naviga-
tional, and Transactional Intent of Web Queries, 44 INFO. PROCESSING & 
MGMT. 1251 (2008); Bing Pan et al., In Google We Trust: Users’ Decisions on 
Rank, Position, and Relevance, 12 J. COMPUTER MEDIATED COMM. 801, 806–07 
(2007). 
 127. See, e.g., FAIRSEARCH, GOOGLE’S TRANSFORMATION FROM GATEWAY 
TO GATEKEEPER: HOW GOOGLE’S EXCLUSIONARY AND ANTICOMPETITIVE CON-
DUCT RESTRICTS INNOVATION AND DECEIVES CONSUMERS 11 (2011); Bracha & 
Pasquale, supra note 56, at 1150–51 (“Located at bottlenecks of the infor-
mation infrastructure, search engines exercise extraordinary control over data 
flow in a largely decentralized network.”); Elkin-Koren, supra note 61, at 180 
(“the new virtual gatekeepers of cyberspace”). 
 128. See, e.g., Grimmelmann, supra note 64, at 447 n.85 (collecting exam-
ples); INITIATIVE FOR A COMPETITIVE ONLINE MARKETPLACE, supra note 46, at 
7–13 (collecting European examples); Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 57 at 
180; Elkin-Koren, supra note 61, at 184–85 (“If you are not listed in the search 
results you are almost nonexistent on the web.”); Pasquale, Asterisk Revisited, 
supra note 63, at 79 (“make-or-break power over internet-based businesses”); 
The Power of Google: Serving Consumers or Threatening Competition?: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. 183 (2011) (written statement of Thomas O. Barnett, Partner, Coving-
ton & Burling) (“And to be found by consumers, particularly for new sites, a 
website needs the ability to appear at or near the top of the results displayed 
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search rankings is “effectively ‘disappeared’ from the Inter-
net.”129
The editor theory takes a very different view of competition 
in the search market.
 
130 In a phrase that Google has made a 
mantra, “Competition is one click away.”131 It emphasizes the 
existence of multiple search options,132 low user switching costs 
to change search engines,133 consumers’ regular use of multiple 
search engines,134 the entry of new specialized search engines,135 
and competition from other platforms like Twitter and Face-
book.136 These points are designed to emphasize that users have 
broad and meaningful choice in how they find websites, and 
that Google is far from the only way that websites can be 
found.137 Indeed, it is common to see arguments that websites 
should be careful not to become too dependent on the traffic 
from any given search engine; if they do, they have only them-
selves to blame.138
 
by a search engine.”). 
 
 129. See, e.g., Foundem’s Google Story, SEARCHNEUTRALITY.ORG (Aug. 18, 
2009), http://www.searchneutrality.org/eu-launches-formal-investigation/ 
foundem-google-story; see also Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 57, at 180 
(noting that search engines wield power over websites in “making others, es-
sentially, disappear”). A related idea is that Google is a “killer.” See Katz, su-
pra note 77 (“brand killer”); Stoppelman Testimony, supra note 77 (“I wonder 
if we would have been able to start Yelp today given Google’s recent actions.”). 
 130. See Goldman, supra note 12, at 195–96. 
 131. Competition, GOOGLE U.S. PUBLIC POLICY, http://www.google.com/ 
publicpolicy/issues/competition.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2013); Schmidt Tes-
timony, supra note 16, at 6; Adam Kovacevich, Google’s Approach to Competi-
tion, GOOGLE PUB. POLICY BLOG (May 8, 2009, 9:24 AM), http:// 
googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2009/05/googles-approach-to-competition.html. 
 132. See, e.g., Volokh & Falk, supra note 13, at 884. 
 133. See, e.g., id. at 893–94. 
 134. See, e.g., Schmidt Testimony, supra note 16, at 132 (responding to 
Sen. Grassley); Ammori & Pelican, supra note 101, at 11. 
 135. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 12, at 197. 
 136. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 86, at 99–100. 
 137. See, e.g., Schmidt Testimony, supra note 16, at 3–4. 
 138. See, e.g., Brief for Defendant, Infederation Ltd. v. Google Inc., [2013] 
EWHC (Ch) No. HC12A02489, [15.2] (Eng.) (“Google cannot be held responsi-
ble for Foundem’s choice of business model. Foundem, at its own risk, appears 
to have developed a business model that depends on its appearing high in free 
search results.”); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 
2003 BL 1897, at *7 (W.D. Okla. Jan 13, 2003) (“SearchKing consciously ac-
cepted the risk of operating a business that is largely dependent on a factor 
(PageRank) over which it admittedly has no control.”); Danny Sullivan, Pen-
guin’s Reminder: Google Doesn’t Owe You a Living, So Don’t Depend on It, 
MARKETING LAND (May 1, 2012), http://marketingland.com/penguin-google 
-doesnt-owe-you-a-living-10968; see also Grimmelmann, Some Skepticism, su-
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III.  THE ADVISOR THEORY   
The conduit and editor theories are not wrong. They are 
merely incomplete. Each has valuable insights about the na-
ture of search, insights unique to the vantage points they 
adopt. The conduit theory looks at search through websites’ 
eyes. The editor theory looks at search through search engines’ 
eyes. But we also can and should ask what search would look 
like through users’ eyes.  
Section A introduces the idea that users turn to search en-
gines for advice to help them decide among websites. Section B 
gives a normative account of why we should prefer this user-
centric take on search. Section C translates this high-level the-
ory into a pair of policy prescriptions. And Section D considers 
some limits on the advisor theory. 
A. SEARCH RESULTS AS ADVICE 
Over half a century ago, Vannevar Bush described the vast 
informational universe we now inhabit: 
Thus far we seem to be worse off than before—for we can enormously 
extend the record; yet even in its present bulk we can hardly consult 
it. This is a much larger matter than merely the extraction of data for 
the purposes of scientific research; it involves the entire process by 
which man profits by his inheritance of acquired knowledge. The 
prime action of use is selection, and here we are halting indeed. There 
may be millions of fine thoughts, and the account of the experience on 
which they are based, all encased within stone walls of acceptable ar-
chitectural form; but if the scholar can get at only one a week by dili-
gent search, his syntheses are not likely to keep up with the current 
scene.139
For centuries, the idea that there is simply too much in-
formation in the world has been a persistent source of anxie-
ty.
 
140 What is new in the age of the Internet is the sheer scale of 
the problem. In 2011, humanity created and stored nearly two 
zettabytes.141
 
pra note 
 The web contains over a trillion different webpag-
64, at 447–48 (questioning websites’ entitlement to traffic from 
search engines). 
 139. Vannevar Bush, As We May Think, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1945, at 
118. 
 140. For histories of attempts to grapple with the problem, see, for exam-
ples, ANN BLAIR, TOO MUCH TO KNOW: MANAGING SCHOLARLY INFORMATION 
BEFORE THE MODERN AGE (2010); JAMES GLEICK, THE INFORMATION: A HIS-
TORY, A THEORY, A FLOOD (2012); ALEX WRIGHT, GLUT: MASTERING INFOR-
MATION THROUGH THE AGES (2007). 
 141. JOHN GANTZ & DAVID REINSEL, IDC IVIEW: EXTRACTING VALUE FROM 
CHAOS 1 (2011). 
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es.142 The world has over two billion Internet users, every single 
one of whom is a potential speaker.143 If you want to listen to 
them all in this lifetime, you have less than one second each—
assuming you do not stop to sleep or eat. We live in Borges’s 
Library of Babel.144
This is a matching problem; the billions of speakers and 
billions of listeners in the world need ways to decide who 
speaks to whom at any given moment. We can approach it in 
two fundamentally different ways. One way would be to try to 
identify the best information sources and make sure they can 
be heard through the cacophony. Although they differ on the 
details, this is the approach taken by the conduit and editor 
theories. The conduit theory worries that valuable and deserv-
ing speakers will be drowned out unless they have search en-
gines’ help. The editor theory sets up search engines as experts 
in identifying the best and most useful information. Both are 
speaker-oriented: they try to solve the problem of noise by am-
plifying good speech. 
 Information itself is a good: the world would 
not be better off if there were far less of it. Rather, the problem 
is that the ratio of information to our ability to make use of it 
has grown beyond all proportion.  
The alternative is listener-oriented: we could try to em-
power users to identify for themselves the speech they wish to 
hear. An engineer would say that you can improve the signal-
to-noise ratio by using either a more powerful transmitter or a 
more sensitive receiver. From a listener-oriented perspective, 
then, a search engine is a tool for choosing which websites to 
listen to.  
Indeed, out of all the ways that speakers and listeners can 
find each other, search is the single most listener-directed. The 
entire point of consulting a search engine is that the user speci-
fies her own interests—not someone else’s—in the search query 
and receives results relating to those interests. A search engine 
that responds to [apple macbook] and [occupy cleveland] 
and [stupid cat tricks] with the same list of results has 
failed of its essential purpose. And users bring a truly remark-
 
 142. Jesse Alpert & Nissan Hajaj, We Knew the Web Was Big . . ., GOOGLE 
OFFICIAL BLOG (July 25, 2008), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/07/we 
-knew-web-was-big.html. 
 143. INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats 
.htm (last updated June 30, 2012) (estimating 2,405,518,376 Internet users). 
 144. See KEVIN KELLY, OUT OF CONTROL 258–63 (1994) (discussing Library 
of Babel as a search problem); Grimmelmann, supra note 79 (giving extended 
metaphor of the Internet as Borges’s infinite Library). 
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able range of interests to search engines. Compare a hundred-
channel cable system, or even a million-volume research li-
brary, with the four hundred and fifty billion distinct search 
queries that Google has answered.145
The crucial technological feature is interactivity. Unlike a 
radio dial or a telephone directory, a search engine is not pre-
sented to users as a static artifact. Instead, search results are 
generated “on the fly,” in response to a user’s specific query, in 
a matter of milliseconds. Having hired the search engine once 
to carry out a search, the user may decide to hire it again to 
perform a related one. She can refine her query by entering 
modified or additional keywords, seeing how this changes the 
results. And when she is satisfied with the search engine’s sug-
gestions, she goes off to a website or websites to attend to their 
speech. 
 
On this view, search results are advice: suggestions about 
which websites the user should consult. Calling search engines 
advice-givers synthesizes the insights of the conduit and editor 
theories. The ultimate goal of search, as the conduit theory ex-
plains, is to connect websites and users.146 Search engines can 
advance this goal, as the editor theory explains, by expressing 
judgments about websites.147
This characterization suggests a third normative theory for 
evaluating search: a search engine should be a helpful, trust-
worthy advisor.
 It is only from the user’s point of 
view that these two functions are not opposites but two sides of 
the same coin. Search engines connect websites and users by 
expressing judgments about websites.  
148
 
 145. See Welcome to Under the Hood, GOOGLE INSIDE SEARCH (Jan. 28, 
2011), http://www.google.hu/insidesearch/underthehood.html. 
 An ideal advisor would have several im-
portant characteristics. It would adopt the user’s agenda, ra-
ther than trying to persuade the user of its own. It would be 
perfectly omniscient; if the sought-after information exists at 
 146. See supra Part II.A. 
 147. See supra Part II.B. 
 148. This view of “advice” puts significant emphasis on its personalization. 
A query-driven search engine of the sort discussed in this Article customizes 
its results based on the queries a user enters, and often based on other charac-
teristics of the user that it is able to determine. Although there is obviously a 
continuum between personalized and nonpersonalized advice—think of a hor-
oscope, which is personalized to the minimal extent of giving the reader one of 
twelve different canned scripts—the distinction is in general significant. See, 
e.g., Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 183 (1985) (holding that publishers of 
“nonpersonalized investment advice and commentary” are not regulated by 
the Investment Advisors Act of 1940). 
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all, the advisor would know where that information is. The ad-
visor would work quickly and cheaply. And having identified 
the information the user seeks, the advisor would step aside 
and let the user make her own decisions about what to do with 
it. 
B. ACTIVE LISTENING 
The advisor theory has two basic commitments. First, it 
puts users’ interests first, rather than websites’ or search en-
gines’: the goal of search is to help users find what they seek. 
And second, it defers to users’ choices in defining those inter-
ests: the goal of search is to help users find what they seek. 
What is so attractive about a world that gives users this capa-
bility? A great deal. It is a world of active listeners who are ca-
pable of exercising autonomous self-directed control over their 
information diets.149 They seek out the speech they wish to hear 
and avoid the speech they wish to ignore. The world is better 
off for it, because the shift to active listening advances the val-
ues we care about. It promotes autonomy, equality, diversity, 
and efficiency.150
First, and most importantly, putting search users first 
promotes autonomy, “an individual’s capacity to author her 
life,” on two levels.
 
151
 
 149. Cf. Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. 
REV. 397, 406–11 (2003). Liu focuses on how listeners engage with speech once 
they know about it and have some measure of access to it; our focus here is on 
how listeners find that speech in the first place. 
 First, there is the ability to choose appro-
 150. This Section attempts, so far as possible, to rest these arguments 
purely on listeners’ interests as listeners, rather than on their interests as fu-
ture speakers. Like Laplace, it has no need of that hypothesis. 
 151. Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Infor-
mation, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 35 (2001). Autonomy is a contested 
concept with multiple overlapping meanings. The sense in which it is used 
here is based primarily on Benkler, at 32–41 and JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY 
OF FREEDOM 368–429 (1986). “An autonomous person’s well-being consists in 
the successful pursuits of self-chosen goals.” RAZ, supra, at 370. Three features 
of this definition are significant. First, autonomy in this sense is a theory of 
“well-being”: a person can be more or less autonomous by degrees, and a per-
son is better off the more autonomous she is. See Benkler, supra, at 33–34. Se-
cond, the person’s goals are “self-chosen”: this form of personal autonomy 
should be contrasted to the Kantian ideal of moral autonomy, in which auton-
omy consists in the rationally self-chosen adoption of universal moral laws. 
See RAZ, supra, at 370 n.2. And third, this conception of autonomy requires 
“successful” pursuit of one’s goals; it is therefore a theory of capabilities and 
not just of authenticity. 
This section deals only with a specific subset of obstacles to autonomy. 
One’s autonomy can fail because of either “internal” or “external” constraints. 
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priate actions for achieving one’s goals. A farmer cares about 
[sorghum yield improvement]; a questioning teen about 
[ways to tell if your gay]. Both of them must make cru-
cial decisions. For them, as for all of us, knowing enough about 
their options and their likely consequences can make the dif-
ference between success and failure, fulfillment and misery. 
They have, in other words, a powerful autonomy interest as lis-
teners.152
But very little of the information we want and need comes 
to us of its own accord: we must go in search of it. The right to 
“seek” information is so fundamental it is recognized in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
 
153
 
Benkler, supra, at 35–38. Internal constraints include the lack of “capacity” to 
make plans for achieving one’s goals and the lack of “will” to stick to those 
plans once made. Id. at 35–36. External constraints, on the other hand, inter-
fere either with one’s ability to choose one’s own goals or with one’s ability to 
take actions that advance those goals. See id. at 36–38. And one’s ability to 
take effective action can fail either because of a lack of options or a lack of 
knowledge about them. RAZ, supra, at 377–78. Out of these five kinds of obsta-
cles—the lack of capacity, will, choice of goals, options, or knowledge—this sec-
tion considers two: interference with one’s choice of goals, and interference 
with one’s knowledge of one’s options for achieving those goals. In Raz’s ter-
minology, the section deals with “manipulation” and not with “coercion.” Id. at 
373. 
 To be effective, this 
active process of seeking out information must include not just 
mere access to raw information, but also the ability to sort 
through it. Just as it is not sufficient to put the farmer and the 
teen in a field and shout at them the things we think they want 
 152. For listener autonomy justifications of free speech protections, see, 
e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, Constitutional Safeguards for Silent Experiments in 
Living: Libraries, The Right to Read, and a First Amendment Theory for an 
Unaccompanied Rights to Receive Information, 74 UMKC L. REV. 799 (2006); 
Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listen-
ing, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 953, 965 (2009); Richard H. Fallon Jr., Two Senses of 
Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 878 (1994); David A.J. Richards, Free Speech 
and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. 
PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 
1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 209 (1972); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, 
and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 355 (1991); Eugene 
Volokh, Freedom of Speech in Cyberspace from the Listener’s Perspective: Pri-
vate Speech Restrictions, Libel, State Action, Harassment, and Sex, 1996 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 377. 
 153. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III)A, ¶ 19, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI)A, ¶ 19(2), at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 
19, 1966). See generally Molly Land, Toward an International Law of the In-
ternet, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 393 (2013) (discussing the history and interpreta-
tion of these provisions of the UDHR and ICCPR). 
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to learn, it is not sufficient to sit them down at a keyboard and 
tell them to have at it. “Selection,” as Vannevar Bush called it, 
is the missing link.154
In particular, empowering users with search protects their 
autonomy from manipulation.
 
155
Access to information, of which the ability to search is a 
crucial component, also matters to autonomy for a second rea-
son. Our goals themselves—not just the means for pursuing 
them—must be self-chosen for us to be truly autonomous.
 The editor theory depends on 
search engines to know what is best for users; the conduit theo-
ry depends on websites to do the same. But users themselves 
are better placed to know what they want and need than any-
one else is. A false claim to have the “lowest propane prices in 
town!” only works on those who can’t search for [lowest pro-
pane prices in town]; a woman seeking [abortion in-
formation] will be offered more useful information and a wid-
er range of options if she uses a search engine than if she calls 
the number on a “Pregnant? Need Help?” billboard. 
156 We 
require what Michael Zimmer calls “intellectual mobility,” 
which he defines as “the freedom to learn new things, explore 
new ideas, adapt, and change one’s thoughts and beliefs in or-
der to grow and develop intellectually as an individual.”157 The 
farmer’s goals—grow more sorghum—seem stable for now, but 
the teen is engaged in the painful process of determining (not 
merely discovering) who he is.158 He will emerge with a new-
found sense of how he wishes to live his life, one he could not 
have specified in advance. If his informational experience lacks 
queer voices because his search tools are unable to find them, 
the self-determination at the core of his autonomy is threat-
ened.159
 
 154. Bush, supra note 128, at 121. 
 
 155. See RAZ, supra note 151, at 377–78 (discussing coercion and manipula-
tion as constraints on independence); Benkler, supra note 151, at 38–49 (dis-
cussing role of information environment in limiting or promoting autonomy). 
 156. See Benkler, supra note 151, at 55. See generally GERALD DWORKIN, 
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1988) (discussing preference-
formation aspects of autonomy). 
 157. Michael Zimmer, The Quest for the Perfect Search Engine: Values, 
Technical Design, and the Flow of Personal Information in Spheres of Mobility 
(unpublished PhD dissertation, NYU 2007). 
 158. See JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, 
CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 84 (2012) (discussing the “emer-
gent self”). 
 159. Cf. Parents, Families, and Friends of Lesbians and Gays, Inc. v. Cam-
denton R-III Sch. Dist., 853 F. Supp. 2d 888, 892 (W.D. Mo. 2012) (enjoining 
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A second major virtue of widespread access to search is in-
formational equality. First, there is equality among users: egal-
itarian access to knowledge requires something like search.160 If 
Affluent Amy has a personal lactation consultant on retainer 
while Backwoods Barbara is fifteen miles from the nearest doc-
tor, it goes a long way toward making up the difference if they 
both can search for [is it safe to breastfeed on su-
dafed].161 Then, there is equality between listeners and speak-
ers. The capacity to listen is distributed far more evenly than 
the capacity to speak.162
Third, equality of access plus individual autonomy equals 
diversity. It is precisely because people have wildly diverging 
needs, capabilities, values, preferences, worldviews, and life 
experiences that the individuation of search matters. A parent 
worrying about [minor child bail eligibility] has vast-
ly different informational needs than a recent arrival in town 
looking for [thai groceries in fresno]. A fifth of the que-
ries Google sees each day are new: no one else has ever used the 
same combination of terms.
 There are billionaires, but no one has a 
billion ears. Disparities in wealth drop away when matching is 
controlled by user interest rather than by who can flood the 
airwaves with the most pervasive advertising. 
163
 
school district from using Internet filter that “systematically allows access to 
websites expressing a negative viewpoint toward LGBT individuals by catego-
rizing them as ‘religion,’ but filters out positive viewpoints to-
ward LGBT issues by categorizing them as ‘sexuality’”); see also Benkler, su-
pra note 
 The development of personalized 
and social search is not just a means towards “better” results, it 
is also a way of accommodating diversity of user interests. One 
man’s noise is another man’s signal; delegating to users the de-
cision of what to search for lets them make different decisions. 
Search also promotes diversity on the level of groups rather 
151, at 42–45 (“Children who grow up with knowledge of a wide 
variety of options for living, and with the capacity to value different options, 
will have a greater role in selecting the option they will pursue as adults than 
children who know no other option.”). 
 160. On access to knowledge and distributive values, see Lea Shaver, The 
Right to Science and Culture, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 121. 
 161. The answer is yes, Sudafed is safe for the baby—but nursing mothers 
may want to avoid it anyway, as it can cause irritability and decrease milk 
production. See Nat’l Lib. of Med., Pseudoephedrine, LACTMED: DRUGS AND 
LACTATION DATABASE, http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov/cgibin/sis/search/f?./temp/~ 
HQ6lW0:1 (last updated Sept. 17, 2013). 
 162. See Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 
1805, 1834–41 (1995) (discussing comparative empowerment of listeners in 
digital environment). 
 163. Welcome to Under the Hood, supra note 145. 
  
900 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:868 
 
than individuals: it facilitates the development of minority and 
micro-minority viewpoints like [dont drone me bro], 
[baha’i homeschooling], and [pinealoma support 
group], because it helps people with shared interests find each 
other. 
Finally, putting good search in users’ hands advances the 
efficiency values already embedded in the numerous bodies of 
law that lay claim to regulate the search process.164 Frequently 
these bodies’ own normative frameworks start from the per-
spective of consumers at large—that is, from the perspective of 
search users.165 So, for example, copyright law is designed to 
“advance public welfare through the talents of authors”166 by of-
fering a “reward to the author or artist [that] serves to induce 
release to the public of the products of his creative genius.”167 
Good search ensures that authors and publishers actually face 
the incentive that copyright wants them to face: public demand 
for their work. Trademark is designed to minimize consumer 
search costs—that is, to make users maximally effective at 
finding the goods and services they seek.168 Antitrust law focus-
es on consumer welfare.169
This is admittedly an idealized portrait of search. The 
search engines we have today deviate from it in many respects. 
The discussion of the conduit and editor theories above illus-
trates some of the numerous ways in which search engines fall 
short, and we shall see further examples below. Search engines 
are less than fully helpful for many searches, and entirely un-
helpful for some. The consequences fall unevenly and not al-
ways visibly on users and websites. But for all that, user em-
powerment is still a worthy ideal, and the closer we can bring 
search engines to it, the better off users will be. The question is 
how. 
 And so on. In each case, adopting us-
ers’ point of view aligns our understanding of search with our 
other goals for search policy. 
 
 164. See Grimmelmann, supra note 1, at 15–51 (detailing thirteen such 
bodies of law). 
 165. Id. at 7, 16. 
 166. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
 167. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). 
 168. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Eco-
nomic Perspective, 30 J. L. & ECON. 265, 281 (1987). 
 169. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 
468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984). 
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C. ACCESS AND LOYALTY 
“The perfect search engine would be like the mind of God,” 
capable of anticipating a user’s needs and satisfying them be-
fore the user can even think to ask.170
1. Access 
 But like divinity, perfect 
search is unattainable in this life. Instead, the legal system 
must deal with the institutional framework of search as it is 
and could be. Law typically responds in two ways when it 
comes across an advice-giving relationship. On the one hand, as 
discussed in Section 1, it tries to ensure that people have access 
to advisors. And on the other, as discussed in Section 2, it tries 
to ensure that people can expect loyalty from their advisors. 
Both principles apply here: users need search engines, and they 
need to be protected from search engines. 
Little more need be said about why access is an important 
value for users. Instead, the question is what law can do to 
promote it. The answer has both negative and positive dimen-
sions. 
On the negative side, some kinds of regulation obviously 
threaten access. German law prohibits Holocaust denial;171 Thai 
law prohibits insulting the king.172 Google frequently removes 
links to these and many other kinds of content when ordered to 
do so by local authorities.173 These deletions directly inhibit us-
ers’ ability to seek out the information they seek. The German 
government doesn’t let users make up their own minds about 
the Holocaust; the Thai government doesn’t let them decide 
whether its monarchy is worthy of respect. When the Chinese 
search engine Baidu blocks searches for information on Falun 
Gong at the Chinese government’s behest,174
 
 170. Charles Ferguson, What’s Next for Google, TECH. REV., Jan., 2005, at 
40, available at http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/403532/whats 
-next-for-google/page/2/ (quoting Sergey Brin, co-founder of Google). 
 it interferes not 
 171. STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I], as amended, § 130(3) (Ger.). 
 172. See Thailand Sentences Editor to 10 Years in Jail for Royal Insult, 
ASIANCORRESPONDENT.COM (Jan. 23, 2013, 12:53 PM), http://www 
.asiancorrespondent.com/96003/thailand-sentences-editor-to-10-years-in-jail 
-for-royal-insult/. 
 173. See generally Transparency Report, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/ 
transparencyreport/removals/government/?hl=en (last visited Nov. 27, 2013) 
(summarizing requests from government agencies and courts, and providing 
specific examples of Google’s response to such requests). 
 174. See, e.g., Ed Felten, Chinese Internet Censorship: See It for Yourself, 
FREEDOM TO TINKER (Apr. 28, 2009), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/ 
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just with users’ religious freedom, but with a basic precondition 
of that freedom.  
Even when the government stops short of deleting or dic-
tating search results, its regulations can still threaten access. If 
search engines weren’t allowed to use location information out 
of privacy concerns, they couldn’t direct users to local business-
es rather than ones halfway around the world. The same ap-
plies to any signal in search engines’ repertoire: limiting its use 
potentially degrades the quality of advice users receive. Even 
seemingly collateral regulations can inhibit access. Advertising 
is the economic engine behind the modern search engine as we 
know it;175
Positively, access can also have a liberal valence: the gov-
ernment should take steps to ensure that users are affirmative-
ly able to make use of good and diverse search engines, helping 
to provide them if the market falls short.
 if keyword advertising were illegal, we wouldn’t have 
Google or Bing. Access therefore can have a libertarian valence: 
governmental regulation of search is problematic because it re-
stricts users’ ability to consult the search engines they might 
have preferred. 
176
 
chinese-internet-censorship-see-it-yourself/. 
 Law has at its dis-
posal the usual tools of information policy: government subsi-
dies, effective competition policy, good technical and legal in-
frastructure, education, and so on. The choice among these 
tools is a matter of praxis, context, and culture. There are many 
roads to relevance. From the user’s point of view, it does not 
matter whether relevant search results are provided by gov-
ernment-subsidized academic research, by a dominant incum-
bent with the resources to invest heavily in product develop-
ment, by a Schumpeterian succession of innovative search 
paradigms, or by cutthroat price and feature competition 
among multiple search engines. Which of these will work 
best—and what technology and competition policy will best 
promote it—is an empirical question. What is good for Google 
might be good for users, or it might not. 
 175. See infra note 323. 
 176. For a particularly ambitious, comprehensive, and inspiring statement 
of this form of access, see SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVE-
RYTHING (AND WHY WE SHOULD WORRY) 204–10 (2011) (describing a proposed 
“Human Knowledge Project” that would be “open, public, global, multilingual, 
and focused”). 
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2. Loyalty 
There is an inescapable information asymmetry between 
users and search engines. No one setting out on a journey of en-
lightenment knows what lies at the end of the road—if she did, 
there would be no need of the journey. The user knows more 
about what she wants, whether it be [free online calculus 
practice questions] or [brinty spiers topless], but 
the search engine knows far more about whether anyone has 
put practice questions online and where those Britney Spears 
pictures are.177
This creates a distinctive possibility for disloyalty. If I 
search for [discount dingos] and the search engine tells me 
about OtterWorld and CapybaraCentral but not DingoMart, it 
has frustrated my dingo-related goals. Perhaps worse, if the 
search engine directs me to DingoBarn because it earns an un-
disclosed 5% commission on referrals, it has abused my trust to 
enrich itself.
 
178 It is precisely because the search engine knows 
more than I do about websites that it can hide what it knows 
from me, or deliberately steer me to sites that serve its goals, 
not mine. Economically, this is a principal-agent problem. I 
cannot fully trust the search engine to exert itself fully on my 
behalf, because I am not fully capable of monitoring it. The 
asymmetry is hard-wired into search; it is not possible to imag-
ine the user-search engine relationship without it.179
Thus, the government can help searchers by taking action 
against search engines that deceive or manipulate, or coerce 
users. Loyalty might, as the editor theory predicts, arise purely 
from competition among search engines. But where loyalty does 
not come about on its own, law can step in to ensure that it 
does.  
 
 
 177. Cf. Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 349 (2005) (developing theory of the “situated user” 
whose “patterns of consumption and the extent and direction of her own au-
thorship” are incompletely formed when she engages with works, and are 
“shaped and continually reshaped by the artifacts, conventions, and institu-
tions that make up her cultural environment”). Although active listening and 
the advisor theory ascribe a greater degree of agency to users than Cohen 
does, they share with her the idea that users are engaged in a process of self-
development. 
 178. Cf. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2013) (requiring disclosure of any “connection 
between the endorser and the seller of the advertised product which might 
materially affect the weight or credibility of the endorsement”). 
 179. Cf. Mark R. Patterson, Non-Network Barriers to Network Neutrality, 
78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2843, 2860 (2010) (discussing the user’s inability to know 
when or whether search engines are returning biased results). 
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The body of law most clearly concerned with problems of 
disloyalty is fiduciary law, which monitors trustees, guardians, 
doctors, corporate directors, and others who “enjoy[] discretion-
ary power over the significant practical interests of another” 
within a particular domain.180
Search engines are not on the list of traditional fiduciaries, 
but the list is not closed. Some courts have recognized spouses 
as fiduciaries for each other
 The case for applying fiduciary 
concepts to search engines has two parts: finding a fiduciary re-
lationship and specifying the fiduciary duties that relationship 
entails. 
181 and we are undergoing some-
thing of an academic fiduciary renaissance, with scholars argu-
ing for treating legislators,182 judges,183 jurors,184 and even 
friends185 as fiduciaries. The common themes of fiduciary rela-
tionships are dependence, trust, and vulnerability.186 The 
search engine provides a valuable service from a position of su-
perior knowledge and superior skill; the user provides it with 
valuable and often sensitive information, trusting in it to pro-
vide suggestions consistent with her interests.187 Search en-
gines resemble lawyers188 and investment advisors, both of 
whom give advice to their clients and are regarded as fiduciar-
ies when they do.189
A useful source for fleshing out the relevant fiduciary du-
ties is agency law.
 
190
 
 180. Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 
262 (2011). 
 Search engines are probably not agents as 
 181. E.g., Dunkin v. Dunkin, 986 P.2d 706, 711–12 (Or. Ct. App. 1999). 
 182. E.g., D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
671 (2013). 
 183. Ethan J. Leib et al., A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. 
REV. 699 (2013). 
 184. Ethan J. Leib et al., Fiduciary Principles and the Jury, 55 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
 185. Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665 (2009). 
 186. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 800 & 
n.17, 810 (1983). 
 187. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 176, at 59. 
 188. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012) (duty of compe-
tence); R. 1.3 (duty of diligence); R. 1.4 (duty of communication and informed 
consent); R. 1.6 (duty of confidentiality). 
 189. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2012) (regarding prohibited transactions by in-
vestment advisers). 
 190. Cf. Mark R. Patterson, On the Impossibility of Information Intermedi-
aries 1–2 (Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 13), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=276968 (de-
scribing information intermediaries as agents that facilitate relationships be-
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such: an agent undertakes to “act on the principal’s behalf and 
subject to the principal’s control”191 and a search engine does 
not typically deal with others on the user’s behalf, nor does the 
user have control over the indexing and ranking process. But 
the portions of agency law that deal with an agent’s duties to 
its principal are instructive. An agent owes a fundamental duty 
“to act loyally for the principal’s benefit,” a duty encompassing 
fidelity, care, confidentiality, and disclosure.192 Thus, we might 
say that a search engine must not let its own conflicts of inter-
est shape the results it gives a user;193 must not deliberately 
underplay its hand in returning results it knows not to be rele-
vant;194 must not misuse the sensitive search queries she sup-
plies it with;195 and must not conceal important facts about how 
it generates search results.196 All of these duties can be waived 
with the user’s consent, but that consent must be both informed 
and obtained in good faith.197
Transparency is a crucial aspect of loyalty. On one level, 
proper disclosures can defuse almost any deception. But on a 
deeper level, transparency is also profoundly helpful in ena-
bling users to understand what it is they are getting from a 
search engine and how to use it effectively. Google’s Inside 
Search blog, which posts discussion of algorithmic additions 
and describes how Google goes about creating search results, is 
 
 
tween providers and seekers of information). 
 191. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). 
 192. See id. § 8.01 (discussing “duty to act loyally for the principal's benefit 
in all matters connected with the agency relationship”). 
 193. See id. § 8.02 (discussing “duty not to acquire material benefit from a 
third party in connection with transactions conducted or other actions taken 
on behalf of the principal”); id. § 8.03 (discussing duty not to act adversely to 
the principal). 
 194. See id. § 8.08 (“If an agent claims to possess special skills or 
knowledge, the agent has a duty to the principal to act with the care, compe-
tence, and diligence normally exercised by agents with such skills or 
knowledge.”). 
 195. See id. § 8.05(2) (discussing duty “not to use or communicate confiden-
tial information of the principal for the agent's own purposes or those of a 
third party”). 
 196. See id. § 8.11 (“An agent has a duty to use reasonable effort to provide 
the principal with facts that the agent knows, has reason to know, or should 
know when . . . the facts are material to the agent's duties to the principal 
. . . .”). 
 197. See id. § 8.06 (“Conduct by an agent . . . does not constitute a breach of 
duty if the principal consents to the conduct, provided that in obtaining the 
principal's consent, the agent acts in good faith, discloses all material facts . . . 
and otherwise deals fairly with the principal . . . .”). 
  
906 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:868 
 
hardly full and complete transparency, but is certainly a signif-
icant start.198
3. Access and Loyalty Compared 
 
In one sense, loyalty is merely a component of access: 
search should be faithful to users’ goals, just like it should be 
fast, comprehensive, and inexpensive. But loyalty is also in 
tension with access, because the possibility of disloyal search 
implies that sometimes bad search can be worse than no search 
at all.199 The legal interventions needed to ensure loyalty may 
sometimes have the effect of foreclosing a technical or business 
model of search. Access alone might have no problem with 
CorruptConcierge.com, which takes bribes from restaurants to 
boost their rankings and conveniently “forgets” to tell users—
but loyalty surely would.200
Access and loyalty are not binding legal rules. They are, 
rather, “midlevel principles” that mediate between the pluralist 
normative commitments described above and the nitty-gritty of 
particular controversies.
 
201
D. LIMITS OF THE ADVISOR THEORY 
 No law is prohibited because it vio-
lates access or is mandatory because it ensures loyalty. Appeals 
to access and loyalty help us think through the consequences of 
search engine practices, and help us devise legal strategies to 
push those practices in the direction of users’ interests. 
So far we have treated search users like the wise child at 
the Passover Seder, asking good questions and receiving mean-
ingful answers.202
 
 198. See, e.g., Amit Singhal, An Update to Our Search Algorithms, GOOGLE 
INSIDE SEARCH (Aug. 10, 2012, 10:30 AM), http://www.insidesearch.blogspot 
.com/2012/08/an-update-to-our-search-algorithms.html. 
 But what if they are more like one of the oth-
 199. Transparency poses particularly complicated challenges. It can ad-
vance access by teaching search literacy, but it can also inhibit access by al-
lowing search engine optimizers to degrade the quality of search rankings by 
cheating their way to the top. See Grimmelmann, supra note 1, at 55–56. 
 200. Cf. Chi-Chu Tschang, The Squeeze at China’s Baidu, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 30, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-12 
-30/the-squeeze-at-chinas-baidu.htm (alleging that Chinese search engine 
Baidu directly retaliates against sites that refuse to buy sponsored links by 
demoting them in its organic rankings). 
 201. See generally ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY 139–58 (2011) (developing theory of midlevel principles for intellectual 
property law). 
 202. See generally NEW AMERICAN HAGGADAH (Jonathan Safra Foer & Na-
than Englander eds. 2012). 
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er three children: wicked, foolish, or simple? If so, the advisor 
theory’s basic commitments—putting users’ interests first and 
deferring to their self-definitions of those interests—may fail to 
hold. These are all serious concerns, as we shall shortly see; the 
advisor theory alone cannot fully address them. But—and this 
is crucial—neither can the conduit and editor theories. Indeed, 
they have much less to say, and they systematically obscure the 
issues at stake when we try to shape search to serve public ra-
ther than private values. The advisor theory is a good first-
order approximation, even if taking more systemic concerns in-
to account will add x2, x3, and other higher-order terms. 
First, there is the wicked child, who searches for [how to 
build an h-bomb], [downtown abbey download epi-
sodes free], [chelsea clinton sex tape], or [kill all 
the jews]. These search results hurt people: invading their 
privacy, infringing their copyrights, promoting violence against 
them, and so on. There is a pattern here. The people who are 
harmed by these results are bystanders.203
But that is precisely the issue from the victim’s perspec-
tive: for her, search works best when it works least. She has a 
point. We have copyright law, defamation law, child pornogra-
phy law, privacy law, and other kinds of information-limiting 
laws for good reasons. They already reflect a considered social 
judgment that some listeners—users—should be denied access 
to speech they would like to receive. So users have an interest 
in consulting search engines to help find information only 
where it is information of a sort they have a legitimate interest 
in receiving. 
 From the perspec-
tive of websites, users, and the search engine that connects 
them, everything is going just fine. The conduit and editor the-
ories lead to precisely the same conclusion as the advisor theo-
ry: there is no problem here. 
Next, there is the foolish child, who searches for [guy hit 
in balls], [dumbass video getting hurt], [epic fail 
waterski], [chainsaw accident], a thousand other varia-
tions on the same theme—and nothing else. This user is using 
search to seal herself off in a private informational bubble con-
taining only humiliation and mutilation.204
 
 203. See Grimmelmann, supra note 
 But society, the 
search for truth, and self-government all depend on dialogue 
1, at 33–44 (describing these as “third 
parties’ interests” in search). 
 204. See ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET IS HIDING 
FROM YOU (2011); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 (2007). 
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and civic education. The user who searches for [george bush 
evil] or [climate change is bs] needs to be gently educat-
ed about different viewpoints; the user who searches for 
[amercian idol] needs to be gently educated, period.  
The conduit theory and the editor theory, being speaker-
oriented, cannot even rightly apprehend the nature of this ob-
jection. Bubbles trap listeners, not speakers. In contrast, the 
bubble argument shares a central premise with the advisor 
theory: users don’t know what information is available when 
they seek it out. They also share a central goal: making users 
better-informed. The difference is that where the advisor theo-
ry sees each search as a step toward enlightenment, the bubble 
theory sees users as trapped in a cycle of self-reinforcing igno-
rance. 
This is a difficult and much-debated subject, and a full dis-
cussion will need to await future work. For the moment, I will 
offer four brief arguments that the bubble theory is a particu-
larly poor fit for search engines. First, it stands in stark con-
tradiction to one of the other most common complaints about 
Google: that its ranking algorithms are too majoritarian, rather 
than too individualized. It can’t both be the case that search 
users are all looking at the same ten websites and that they’re 
all living in their own individual information bubbles. Second, 
there is a deep and abiding human taste for novelty, for seren-
dipity, for the unfamiliar. Search engines are particularly use-
ful in helping people explore new interests quickly and easily.205 
Third, the consequences of forcing search users to look at re-
sults they didn’t ask for and don’t want to see are dreadful. It 
turns users into Alex from A Clockwork Orange, forcibly sub-
jected to high culture and unpleasant truths.206
 
 205. Cf. A. Lev-On, The Democratizing Effects of Search Engine Use: On 
Chance Exposures and Organizational Hubs, in WEB SEARCH: MULTIDISCIPLI-
NARY PERSPECTIVES 135, 138–41 (Amanda Spink & Michael Zimmer eds., 
2008) (arguing that search engines “drive people to diverse and even opposing 
views”). Eric Goldman argues that “Coasean filters [his term for good match-
ing systems] would not extinguish serendipitous exposures to unrequested 
content because they would proactively generate content catering to consum-
ers’ latent interests.” Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis of Marketing, 2006 
WIS. L. REV. 1151, 1219. He is right that the human taste for serendipity is 
one that search engines and other matching systems do and should cater to, 
but it is not really plausible to describe these tastes as “latent.” Pleasure and 
knowledge are not just the surfacing of buried memories. Cf. Plato, Meno, in 
FIVE DIALOGUES 58 (G.M.A. Grube trans., John M. Cooper 2d ed. 2002). 
 This is a partic-
ular tragedy on the advisor theory, since the very point of 
 206. A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (Warner Bros. 1971). 
  
2014] SPEECH ENGINES 909 
 
search is that it can do so much more to enhance individual au-
tonomy and personal development. And fourth, if the fear is 
that a personalized search engine will wrongly extrapolate from 
a small sample of queries to trap the user in a bubble that dis-
torts her preferences, the problem is disloyal search engines, 
not foolish users. Rather than being too user-directed, the 
speech environment is not user-directed enough.207
Finally, there is the simple child, who misunderstands 
search results. She searches for [vaccination] and treats 
Natural News (“Secret government documents reveal vaccines 
to be a total hoax”)
  
208 as authoritative because it was on Google; 
or for [42 inch visio tv] and assumes the first result must 
have the cheapest price because it is first; or for [obama mus-
lim] and doesn’t scroll down far enough to find the Wikipedia 
entry. Studies have found that users trust search engines,209
Troublingly, Google shows every sign of wanting to push 
even further. As Eric Schmidt put it, Google wants to be able to 
answer questions like “What shall I do tomorrow?” or “What job 
shall I take?”
 
but also that they have woefully poor understandings of how 
search engines work. The combination is dangerous, because it 
causes overreliance on search results. Instead of independently 
evaluating websites for themselves, users invest them with the 
search engine’s authority. 
210 This is an autonomy-reducing relationship: 
even if the search engine is capable of satisfying users, it is no 
longer really helping them lead self-directed lives.211
 
 207. One useful policy intervention might be to require that search engines 
must offer a non-personalized mode: a user must be able, at any time, to step 
outside her bubble by disabling the customized filters the search engine has 
created for her, and to receive generic, non-personalized results. Put another 
way, the best remedy for bad search is more search. 
 When a 
search engine usurps the user’s core decision-making authority, 
it is hard not to describe the result as a serious violation of loy-
 208. Ethan A. Huff, Secret Government Documents Reveal Vaccines to Be a 
Total Hoax, NATURALNEWS.COM (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.naturalnews.com/ 
038598_vaccines_medical_hoax_government_documents.html. 
 209. See Pan et al., supra note 126. 
 210. Caroline Daniel & Maija Palmer, Google’s Goal: to Organise Your Dai-
ly Life, FIN. TIMES (London) (May 22, 2007, 9:08 PM), http://www.ft.com/ 
intl/cms/s/2/c3e49548-088e-11dc-b11e-000b5df10621.html#axzz2ggj5tsvs. 
 211. The best articulations of this fear come from science-fiction writers. 
See Ken Liu, The Perfect Match, LIGHTSPEED (Dec. 2012), http://www 
.lightspeedmagazine.com/fiction/the-perfect-match/; Tom Slee, Mr. Google’s 
Guidebook, WHIMSLEY (Mar. 7, 2008), http://whimsley.typepad.com/whimsley/ 
2008/03/mr-googles-guid.html. 
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alty. Advice becomes a command; relevance gives way to some-
thing far more sinister. It is precisely for this reason that que-
ry-driven web search is better for autonomy than implicit rec-
ommendation systems like Facebook’s selections of which 
stories from your friends to show you.212
A final concern is the growing importance of distributed, 
interactive, algorithmic processes in the sociotechnical co-
construction of meaning and authority. Choices made by pro-
grammers, publishers, and users feed back into each other re-
cursively with emergent, systemic consequences. At present, we 
barely have the vocabulary to describe these processes, let 
alone the theoretical frameworks to explicate them.
 
213
To the extent search engine law attempts to incorporate a 
more systemic perspective, neither the conduit theory nor the 
editor theory is much help. Both of them obscure the problem of 
algorithmic authority. The conduit theory upholds an impossi-
ble ideal of neutrality; it can tolerate algorithms only to the ex-
tent that it fully specifies their results, that is, not at all. The 
editor theory, by contrast, accepts whatever results from the 
marketplace’s clash of algorithmic titans as an optimal out-
come. The editor theory systematically refuses to look inside 
the algorithmic black box; the conduit theory smashes all such 
boxes to smithereens. The advisor theory, by contrast, accepts 
that we increasingly live in a world of algorithms and asks how 
well they serve the goals of their users. It offers no special in-
sight into the workings of those algorithms, but it is prepared 
to engage with those insights when other theories offer them 
up. It is, at least, a place to start. 
 They are 
characterized by structures of information aggregation and dis-
tribution that are not necessarily intended or even compre-
hended by any of the contributors to those structures. 
 
 212. See Thomas E. Weber, Cracking the Facebook Code, THE DAILY BEAST 
(Oct. 18, 2010, 2:57 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/10/18/ 
the-facebook-news-feed-how-it-works-the-10-biggest-secrets.html. Thus, there 
are strong reasons to reject the convergence of search, advertising, and rec-
ommendation systems hailed by some commentators. E.g., Hector Garcia-
Molina et al., Information Seeking: Convergence of Search, Recommendations, 
and Advertising, 54 COMM. ACM 121, 126 (2011). They may be technically sim-
ilar, but they are not normatively equivalent: one of them (search) is better 
than the others. 
 213. A particularly useful survey of existing work and outline for future 
efforts is Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms, in MEDIA TECHNOL-
OGIES (Tarleton Gillespie et al. eds., forthcoming Jan. 2014). 
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IV.  SEARCH BIAS RECONSIDERED   
We are now in a position to apply the advisor theory to 
specific legal problems. Search bias, the most controversial of 
the many controversial claims against Google, is a good place to 
start. 
An early search bias lawsuit, Search King v. Google, is still 
the leading example of the genre.214 Search King alleged that 
Google reduced its PageRank—one of the most important sig-
nals used by Google to estimate a webpage’s importance—from 
8 to 4, causing a precipitous drop in its traffic from Google and 
a concomitant fall-off in business.215 Search King sued for tor-
tious interference with contractual relations, arguing that 
Google devalued it “after and because Google learned that 
[Search King] was competing with Google.”216
Search King also shows what tends to happen to search-
bias claims in court: they lose. Search King claimed that 
PageRanks were “objectively verifiable” and that Google 
changed them “purposefully and maliciously,” rendering its 
conduct “wrongful” and harming Search King.
 
217 But Google re-
sponded, and the court agreed, that ranking decisions were 
“fundamentally subjective,” so that there was “no conceivable 
way to prove that the relative significance assigned to a given 
web site is false.”218 As a consequence, Google’s search results 
were “constitutionally protected opinions,” rendering them 
“immune from tort liability.”219
 
 214. No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003). 
For other notable search bias cases, see supra note 
 The conduit theory met the edi-
tor theory, and the editor theory won. But both approaches are 
too categorical. Search results are a mix of the objective and the 
subjective. It is not possible to classify them as exclusively one 
or the other. 
16. This Part will restrict 
its attention to tort suits for misranking, rather than considering the whole 
range of possible regulations to prevent search bias. The application of the 
First Amendment to a tortious interference claim raises all of the essential is-
sues. And the approach this Part endorses, in which the search engine’s im-
munity turns on its good faith in answering users’ queries, is broadly applica-
ble to search bias issues, regardless of what doctrinal box they arrive packaged 
in. 
 215. Search King, 2003 WL 21464568, at *1. 
 216. Id. at *2. 
 217. Id. at *2–3. 
 218. Id. at *3–4. 
 219. Id. 
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Instead, a better approach to search bias is to look at rank-
ings from users’ point of view. When a search engine gives ad-
vice to users, it speaks; there is no way to understand the giv-
ing of advice without implicating speech’s communicative 
function.220
This Part works through the proper First Amendment 
analysis of a Search King-style tortious interference claim.
 Moreover, a search engine’s advice is socially valua-
ble speech; we have seen an abundance of reasons why users as 
listeners would suffer if this speech could be suppressed. But it 
does not follow that search results ought to be categorically pro-
tected by the First Amendment. Precisely because they are val-
uable instrumentally rather than expressively, search results 
should not be protected where they deceive the users they are 
meant to inform. 
221
 
 220. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1445 (2013). Another commentator, Andrew Tutt, argues, “Software, in 
other words, should be considered not for what it is or even what it says but 
for what it means to society to treat it like speech. Whether operating systems, 
search engines, and word processors are ‘speech’ depends on the position these 
categories occupy within our democracy.” Andrew Tutt, Essay, Software 
Speech, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 73, 77 (2012). On the level of principles, he is 
obviously right. But the only way to understand “the position these categories 
occupy within our democracy” is to examine them closely, asking what mes-
sages software systems communicate to whom and how the listeners under-
stand those messages and act on them. This factually focused analysis 
achieves Tutt’s goal of getting beyond unhelpful categories like “word proces-
sor” and “video game,” id. at 76, by bringing out the cultural and social prac-
tices associated with specific pieces of software in specific contexts. 
 
Section A unpacks search rankings to show that they consist of 
the search engine’s opinions about relevance to the user. Sec-
tion B argues that the crucial doctrinal question in such a claim 
is whether a ranking is demonstrably false and made with 
knowledge of its falsity. Section C puts these two points togeth-
er. It argues that it is not possible to prove a ranking false by 
proving it objectively wrong, but it is possible to prove a rank-
ing false by proving it subjectively dishonest. Or, more concise-
ly, Section A presents the facts, Section B the law, and Section 
C the application of law to fact.  
 221. This Part considers only tort claims, not potential search neutrality 
regulations. With the end of the FTC’s search-bias investigation, no such regu-
lations appear likely in any jurisdiction where the First Amendment applies. 
Any extended discussion of them would be painfully hypothetical, filled with 
assumptions and subjunctives. That said, there is a strong argument that the 
First Amendment would allow user-protective legislation and FTC enforce-
ment actions that go beyond the limits applicable to tortious-interference 
claims. A few key points of this argument are set out in the margin infra notes 
300 and 304. 
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The rest of the Part cleans up some loose threads. Section 
D argues that it makes no difference that search results are 
generated using computer algorithms rather than by hand. And 
Section E pulls these claims together to defend, for the most 
part, the Federal Trade Commission’s handling of the search 
bias claims against Google. 
A. SEARCH RANKINGS ARE OPINIONS ABOUT RELEVANCE 
If there is one thing everyone can agree on in the search 
bias debate, it is that the sine qua non of search results is rele-
vance. Compare Google critic Adam Raff’s demand that search 
results should be “based solely on relevance”222 with Google en-
gineer Amit Singhal’s insistence that Google’s “algorithms rank 
results based only on what the most relevant answers are for 
users.”223
Neither the conduit theory nor the advisor theory can pro-
vide a usable definition of relevance, because neither websites 
nor search engines are proper judges of relevance. For every 
website that gains in the rankings there is another that falls; 
there is no way to break the tie between DingoMart and 
DingoBarn’s competing claims. But if “relevance” is a quality 
created by a search engine then it is devoid of meaning; the top 
result for [dingo] is the most relevant, regardless of whether it 
has anything to do with dingos.
  
224
The advisor theory does better at capturing relevance; it 
asks us to take users’ point of view. Through a user’s eyes, a 
relevant result is one that helps her achieve her personal in-
formational goals; an irrelevant result is one that does not. As 
one textbook explains: 
 The conduit theory is inde-
terminate; the editor theory is tautological. 
  A human is not a device that reliably reports a gold standard 
judgment of relevance of a document to a query. Rather, humans and 
their relevance judgments are quite idiosyncratic and variable. But 
this is not a problem to be solved: In the final analysis, the success of 
an [information retrieval] system depends on how good it is at satisfy-
 
 222. Raff, supra note 2. 
 223. Amit Singhal, Setting the Record Straight: Competition in Search, 
GOOGLE PUB. POL’Y BLOG (June 8, 2012), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot 
.com/2012/06/setting-record-straight-competition-in.html. 
 224. Cf. James Grimmelmann, Three Theories of Copyright in Ratings, 14 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 851, 876 (2012) (critiquing claim that expressive rat-
ings are valuable simply because they are expressive). 
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ing the needs of these idiosyncratic humans, one information need at 
a time.
225
Search engines face two linked problems in trying to satis-
fy users’ standards of relevance: the diversity of users with dif-
ferent intentions, and the difficulty of inferring intention from 
a bare search query. “[E]ven if two people use the exact same 
words to ask a question, they may be asking very different 
things.”
 
226 Google asserts that information about the Founding 
Farmers restaurant is the most relevant result for [founding 
farmers]. Perhaps it is, and many people would agree. But 
what about a user looking for the February 2012 blog post from 
the Paris Review Daily reviewing a modern edition of Martha 
Washington’s family recipe collection—a post entitled “The 
Founding Farmers”?227 For some users, this post is more rele-
vant than the restaurant’s homepage. Other users may be look-
ing for critical reviews of the restaurant or for amusing stories 
about its knowledgeable but inattentive servers.228
Search engines respond to the ambiguities of relevance in 
three stages: they measure users’ satisfaction with search re-
 
 
 225. CHRISTOPHER D. MANNING ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION 
RETRIEVAL 151 (2008); see also KEN HILLIS ET AL., GOOGLE AND THE CULTURE 
OF SEARCH 53–76 (2013) (discussing Google’s understanding of “relevance”); 
Van Couvering, supra note 116 (“‘Really, it is the standard definition, which is, 
we are trying to answer people's questions. Period. Relevance is when we ac-
tually return something that answers their question.’” (quoting “Interviewee 
E”)). 
 226. @CopyrightLibn [Nancy Sims], TWITTER (July 11, 2013, 11:57 AM), 
https://twitter.com/copyrightlibn/status/355400591998058497. 
 227. Robin Bellinger, The Founding Farmers, PARIS REV. DAILY (Feb. 23, 
2012), http://www.theparisreview.org/blog/2012/02/23/the-founding-farmers/. 
 228. For examples of the ambiguities inherent in trying to satisfy users’ 
diverse standards of relevance, it is hard to beat the guidelines Google gives to 
its human reviewers. See Search Quality Rating Guidelines 1.0, GOOGLE (Nov. 
2, 2012), http://static.googleusercontent.com/external_content/untrusted_dlcp/ 
www.google.com/en/us/intl/en_us/insidesearch/howsearchworks/assets/ 
searchqualityevaluatorguidelines.pdf. “Many queries have more than one 
meaning,” and raters are asked to classify them as “dominant,” “common,” or 
“minor.” Id. § 2.3, at 8. For example, “The query [mercury], English (US) 
might refer to the car brand, the planet, or the chemical element (Hg). While 
none of these is clearly dominant, all are common interpretations. Many or 
some people might want results related to these interpretations.” Id. The que-
ry [Nikon digital camera] seems clearer at first glance, but the guidelines note 
that “Some users may have decided to buy a Nikon (‘do’), but some may be re-
searching the Nikon brand (‘know’), and some may want to go to digital cam-
era pages on the Nikon website (‘go’).” Id. § 2.4.4, at 11. Search engineers, 
trademark lawyers, and lexicographers all know that words and phrases are 
capable of sustaining multiple unrelated meanings, depending on the context 
in which they appear. 
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sults,229 they predict how users will react to other results using 
general theories of relevance,230 and they implement those theo-
ries in the algorithms that respond to users’ queries.231 Each 
stage introduces its own approximations. At the measurement 
stage, no focus group or A/B test is ever comprehensive enough 
to capture the preferences of every user in the world; even if it 
could, users would still misreport their long-term goals and 
click on promising-looking results that turn out to be worthless 
on further inspection. At the prediction stage, the search en-
gine must extrapolate from queries and webpages it has seen to 
ones it has not. Extrapolations are guesses; guesses can be 
wrong. And at the implementation stage, each algorithmic 
tweak to improve relevance must be traded off against very real 
costs. There are fixed costs, incurred simply to program and 
test the tweak, and there are incremental costs, as each addi-
tional computation drives up power bills,232 hardware purchas-
es,233 and user waiting times.234
Thus, search results are neither entirely “objective” nor en-
tirely “subjective.” The confusion that has surrounded the ques-
tion for a decade is a result of conflating users’ and search en-
gines’ views of relevance. From a user’s perspective, relevance 
is a subjective goal. But from a search engine’s perspective, 
search rankings are approximations of objectively but imper-
fectly observable characteristics of subjective user preferences, 
embodied in the search engine’s choices about its algorithms. It 
is these choices—disagreements about the most effective way to 
 Different search engines use 
different metrics, theories, and implementations, and hence 
they deliver different search results. 
 
 229. See, e.g., id. at 6. Even this 43-page document is a “gutted” version of a 
161-page set of guidelines in use internally. See Matt McGee, Google Gutted 
Its Search Quality Rating Guidelines for Public Release, SEARCH ENGINE LAND 
(Mar. 1, 2013, 4:08 PM), http://searchengineland.com/google-gutted-its 
-search-quality-rating-guidelines-for-public-release-150281. 
 230. PageRank is the most obvious example: the theory behind using links 
to rank pages is that users will tend to find more highly linked pages to be 
more relevant. See Levy, supra note 23, at 98–99. The same is true for any 
other signal a search engine uses: the signal is a theory about relevance. Id. 
 231. See id. 
 232. See Xiaobo Fan et al., Power Provisioning for a Warehouse-Sized Com-
puter, 34TH ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE 13 (2007). 
 233. See Luiz André Barroso et al., Web Search for a Planet: The Google 
Cluster Architecture, IEEE COMPUTER SOC’Y 22, 25 (2003). 
 234. See Jake Brutlag, Speed Matters for Google Web Search, GOOGLE 
(June 22, 2009), http://services.google.com/fh/files/blogs/google_delayexp.pdf 
(“Experiments demonstrate that increasing web search latency reduces the 
daily number of searches per use by 0.2% to 0.6%.”). 
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measure and implement relevance—that constitute the “opin-
ions” in search.235
There are, in other words, two different kinds of opinions 
at work in search. Let us call them “normative” and “descrip-
tive,” respectively.
 
236 Users have normative opinions about rele-
vance: expressions of the holder’s personal tastes and values. 
But search engines have descriptive opinions about relevance: 
claims about facts in the world under conditions of uncertainty. 
Dale Peck’s assertion that Rick Moody is “the worst writer of 
his generation” is a normative opinion;237 a forecaster’s predic-
tion that it will be 84º and sunny in Los Angeles tomorrow is a 
descriptive opinion.238 Normative opinions are wholly subjec-
tive; descriptive opinions are subjective in that they express the 
speaker’s personal belief about something not universally 
agreed-on, but objective in that this something exists inde-
pendently of the speaker.239
 
 235. As this point should make clear, opinions about the best way to assess 
relevance are not “speech” the First Amendment is concerned with. I may have 
an opinion about the most effective way to mow my lawn; that does not mean 
that mowing my lawn is speech. The resulting search rankings may be speech, 
but that is because they communicate claims about relevance, not because 
they communicate an idea about the best way to assess relevance. 
  
 236. This distinction is similar to one drawn in W. Page Keeton, Defama-
tion and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1221, 1233–34 (1976) between 
“evaluative” and “deductive” opinions. Keeton’s category of “deductive” opin-
ions, however, is inapt because he defines them in terms of how they are de-
rived—they are “drawn as an inference from the existence of other facts”—
rather than in terms of how they function as communicative acts—they make 
claims that are in theory subject to observation by others. See also Wendy 
Gerwick Couture, Opinions Actionable as Securities Fraud, 73 LA. L. REV. 382, 
408–14 (2013) (extending Keeton’s distinction to securities law). A third kind 
of “opinion” shows up in the case reports: “loose, figurative” language not 
meant to be understood as making truth-valued claims at all. Old Dominion 
Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284 
(1974); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Curbing the High Price of Loose Talk, 18 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 359, 398–99 (1985) (identifying this third category of “opin-
ion”). 
 237. Dale Peck, The Moody Blues, NEW REPUBLIC, July 1, 2002, available 
at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/books-and-arts/the-moody-blues (re-
viewing RICK MOODY, THE BLACK VEIL: A MEMOIR WITH DIGRESSIONS (2002)). 
 238. See generally L.A. STORY (TriStar Pictures 1991). 
 239. See Ronald K. Chen, Once More into the Breach: Fact Versus Opinion 
Revisited After Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 1 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 
331, 335 (1991) (describing what I call descriptive opinions as “speculation”); 
Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous 
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 601, 657 (1990) (explaining that “verifiable” statements are 
those for which “given enough time and effort, we would expect the claim to be 
confirmed or disconfirmed by a consensus of investigators”). The underlying 
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In his Senate testimony in September 2011, Eric Schmidt 
seemed to further confuse the objective/subjective debate when 
he called Google’s rankings its “scientific opinion.”240 But this is 
actually a helpful way of thinking about search results, per-
haps more so than Schmidt realized. Google studies the world, 
draws conclusions, and shares them with the public, just as sci-
entists do.241 Google is not “scientific” in the sociological sense 
that it publishes theories of relevance for peer evaluation. But 
it aspires to be “scientific” in the sense of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence’s definition of “scientific . . . knowledge,” which must 
be “based on sufficient facts or data” and “the product of relia-
ble principles and methods” that are “reliably applied . . . to the 
facts.”242 Scientific opinions are subjective to the extent that re-
ality is unknowable and scientists must forever make do with 
dueling hypotheses and insufficient data. But they are objective 
to the extent that they are based on reality and seek to describe 
the world as it is.243 Search results seek to answer the imper-
fectly answerable question of what users want.244
B. THE FIRST AMENDMENT REQUIRES FALSITY AND FAULT 
 
Now that we have a handle on what search rankings are—
descriptive opinions—it is time to consider what First Amend-
ment standard applies to them. This Section argues that for a 
 
assumption here, about the existence of “facts” in the world, passes over some 
significant epistemological difficulties. For a more sophisticated treatment of 
the issue, see Post, supra, at 656–61. For present purposes, nothing essential 
depends on this precision. 
 240. Schmidt Testimony, supra note 16, at 234; cf., Dana Remus Irwin, 
Freedom of Thought: The First Amendment and the Scientific Method, 2005 
WIS. L. REV. 1479, 1481–92 (discussing scholarship on the application of the 
First Amendment to scientific inquiry). 
 241. See Schmidt Testimony, supra note 16, at 234 (“constantly experi-
menting”).  
 242. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 243. See ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490, 496 (2d 
Cir. 2013) (“Most conclusions contained in a scientific journal article are, in 
principle, capable of verification or refutation by means of objective proof. In-
deed, it is the very premise of the scientific enterprise that it engages with 
empirically verifiable facts about the universe. At the same time, however, it 
is the essence of the scientific method that the conclusions of empirical re-
search are tentative and subject to revision, because they represent inferences 
about the nature of reality based on the results of experimentation and obser-
vation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 244. See Our Products and Services, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/ 
company/products/ (“Larry Page, our co-founder and CEO, once described the 
‘perfect search engine’ as something that ‘understands exactly what you mean 
and gives you back exactly what you want.’”). 
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statement of this sort to be actionable in a tortious interference 
suit, it must be provably false and the speaker must have acted 
with a sufficient degree of fault. (For present purposes, we can 
assume that the fault standard is actual malice.) Subsection 1 
locates this standard in the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.; Subsection 2 responds to con-
duit- and editor-theory objections that some other standard 
ought to apply. 
1. Milkovich 
The First Amendment standard applied in Search King, 
the leading search bias case against Google, comes from the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,245 
a defamation case against a newspaper for a column saying 
that “Anyone who attended the [wrestling] meet . . . knows in 
his heart that [the plaintiffs] lied at the hearing after each hav-
ing given his solemn oath to tell the truth.”246 The newspaper 
argued that the statement was protected as an “opinion,” but 
the Supreme Court disagreed. There was no “wholesale defa-
mation exemption for anything that might be labeled ‘opinion,’” 
and no need to divide statements into categories of “opinion” or 
“fact.”247
Instead, the Court applied its usual First Amendment pro-
tections against defamation. A statement about a public figure 
on a matter of public concern by a media defendant “must be 
provable as false before there can be liability” and the defend-
ant must have acted with actual malice, that is, “with 
knowledge of their false implications or with reckless disregard 
of their truth.”
 
248 Thus, regardless of how they are labeled, 
statements that knowingly “imply a false assertion of fact” can 
be actionable.249
 
 245. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). 
 
 246. Id. at 5. 
 247. Id. at 18. 
 248. Id. at 20–21. 
 249. It is still common to see in lower-court opinions a distinction between 
actionable statements of “fact” and non-actionable statements of “opinion.” 
These courts are misreading Milkovich, which rejected this very dichotomy. 
See Robert D. Sack, Protection of Opinion Under the First Amendment: Reflec-
tions on Alfred Hill, “Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment,” 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 294, 320–21 (2000). Sometimes, they distinguish “fact” 
from “opinion” by saying that the former are capable of being proven false and 
the latter are not. Since falsifiability was the basis of the Court’s holding in 
Milkovich, no real harm is done. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21. But when 
courts draw on the vague contextual factors the Court rejected, the result is a 
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Milkovich thus directs us to ask two questions: does the 
challenged speech make a false assertion of fact, and if so, is it 
uttered with a sufficient degree of fault? The precise degree of 
fault required may vary,250 but in thinking about search bias, 
we can avoid these doctrinal difficulties by assuming that the 
actual-malice standard applies.251 Search King, like other 
search-bias plaintiffs, alleged that Google acted with the intent 
to cause harm and with knowledge that its manipulated rank-
ings were false.252
2. Some Objections 
 
On this view, showings of falsity and fault are both neces-
sary and sufficient to hold a search engine liable in tort for 
misranking a website. This position has been challenged from 
both sides. Conduit theorists have said that falsity and fault 
are not necessary; editor theorists have said that falsity and 
fault are not sufficient. Both are wrong; Milkovich provides the 
correct standard.253
On the conduit side, Oren Bracha and Frank Pasquale 
point to “the uncovered speech in an aircraft navigational 
 
 
hopeless muddle. See, e.g., Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 861 
(9th Cir. 1999); Sack, supra, at 324–25 (criticizing Gilbrook and similar opin-
ions). 
 250. The Court has been less concerned, for example, about protecting 
statements about private individuals or on matters of private concern. See 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (“[S]o long as they do not 
impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appro-
priate standard of liability” for an award of actual damages for a false state-
ment by a media defendant about a private individual.); Dun & Bradstreet, 
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760–61 (1985) (allowing an 
award of presumed and punitive damages for a false statement on a matter of 
private concern even without actual malice). The holding of Greenmoss is elu-
sive, as no opinion commanded a majority. See generally Lee Levine & Ste-
phen Wermiel, The Landmark that Wasn’t: A First Amendment Play in Five 
Acts, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2013) (reviewing in detail the Justices’ deliberations 
and internal debates over Greenmoss). 
 251. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 252. See Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 
WL 21464568, at *2–3 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003). 
 253. This claim requires one qualification, albeit one that is tangential to 
the concerns at stake in the search-bias debate. After United States v. Alvarez, 
132 S.Ct. 2537 (2012), it is likely that a prohibition on false speech must also 
target a “subset of lies where specific harm is more likely to occur.” Id. at 2555 
(Breyer, J., concurring). For present purposes, this is unlikely to be an issue. 
Search bias suits like Search King sound in the well-established intentional 
interference tort, which sufficiently limits suits to an appropriate “subset” of 
cases in which the plaintiff can allege genuine economic injuries. 
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chart”254 in the case of Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., where the 
defendant published a chart incorrectly stating that the Mar-
tinsburg, WV airport had an instrument landing system.255 An 
experienced pilot using the chart tried to make an instrument 
landing at Martinsburg and crashed on approach, killing him-
self, his father, and his son.256 The Second Circuit affirmed a ju-
ry verdict that the chart was a defective product.257 Saloomey 
and other aircraft-chart cases generally do not even discuss the 
First Amendment; Bracha and Pasquale would say that it is 
similarly inapplicable to search rankings.258
The result in Saloomey makes sense, but let us be clear 
about the reason. The chart was defective because the infor-
mation it presented was false. If the chart had truthfully de-
scribed the facilities available at the Martinsburg airport, the 
First Amendment would have barred the suit. Jeppesen has a 
First Amendment right to sell accurate charts, but not to sell 
inaccurate ones.
 
259 In other words, the factual speech at issue in 
Saloomey and the other products liability cases is not uncov-
ered speech, which is “measured against no First Amendment 
standard whatsoever” and for which “[t]he First Amendment 
just does not show up.”260 Rather, it is unprotected speech, 
which faces “the full arsenal of First Amendment rules, princi-
ples, standards, distinctions, presumptions, tools, factors, and 
three-part tests” and is found wanting.261
On the editor side, Eugene Volokh and Donald Falk cite 
Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons for the proposition that search 
results are pure expression and fully protected speech.
 
262
 
 254. Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 
 There, 
56, at 1194 & n.237. 
 255. Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 672 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 256. Id. at 672–73. 
 257. Id. at 672. 
 258. Another navigational-chart case of note is Brocklesby v. United States, 
767 F.2d 1288, 1295 n.9 (9th Cir. 1985), which refused to consider a First 
Amendment defense because the defendant raised the issue for the first time 
on appeal. An earlier but withdrawn panel opinion rejected the defense, call-
ing the chart a “false or misleading commercial message[].” Brocklesby v. 
United States, 753 F.2d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 1985), withdrawn and amended, 
767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 259. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670–71 (2011) 
(striking down law prohibiting sale of truthful information). 
 260. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Prelim-
inary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769 
(2004). 
 261. Id. 
 262. See Volokh & Falk, supra note 13, at 890. 
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the plaintiffs were “mushroom enthusiasts who became severe-
ly ill from picking and eating mushrooms after relying on in-
formation in The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms, a book published 
by the defendant.”263 As a matter of tort law subject to the “gen-
tle tug of the First Amendment and the values embodied there-
in,” the Ninth Circuit held that the publisher had no “duty to 
investigate the accuracy of the contents of the books it publish-
es.”264 For Volokh and Falk, Google is a publisher just like Put-
nam: its speech is both covered and protected.265
But Winter does not stand for the proposition that the First 
Amendment absolutely shields the publishers of harmful misin-
formation. In a footnote, the court added that a “stronger ar-
gument might be made” in a case involving “fraudulent, inten-
tional, or malicious misrepresentation.”
 
266 Winter, in other 
words, is a case about fault rather than falsity: strict liability or 
negligence will not support a lawsuit against a book publisher, 
but worse misconduct may.267 That has to be right. The First 
Amendment should not shield a publisher who advises readers 
to eat Amanita phalloides with liver failure aforethought. For 
prudential reasons, it makes sense to hold Jeppesen to a higher 
standard of care than Putnam given the nature of their respec-
tive publications.268
 
 263. Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 But in both cases, the crucial threshold of 
 264. Id. at 1037. 
 265. See Volokh & Falk, supra note 13, at 892. 
 266. Winter, 938 F.2d at 1037 n.9. 
 267. The same principle applies to other lawsuits by readers who were in-
jured after following bad advice in publications. See, e.g., Cardozo v. True, 342 
So. 2d 1053, 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (cookbook with recipe including 
taro roots, which are toxic when eaten raw); Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 124 
(Pa. Super Ct. 1989) (book recommending “liquid protein diet”); Herceg v. Hus-
tler Magazine, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802, 803 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (magazine story 
describing autoerotic asphyxiation). These cases should be distinguished from 
the lawsuits over information that is harmful to third parties when acted on. 
See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enter., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 1997) (suit by 
family of murder victims against publisher of HIT MAN: A TECHNICAL MANUAL 
FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS). See generally Eugene Volokh, Crime-
Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1128–32 (2005) (discussing these 
latter cases in great detail). The former involve dangerous falsehoods; the lat-
ter involve dangerous truths. See Susan M. Gilles, “Poisonous” Publications 
and Other False Speech Physical Harm Cases, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1073, 
1077–78 (2002) (making distinction). See generally Juliet Dee, “How-To” Man-
uals for Hitmen: Paladin Press, a Triple Murder, and First Amendment Protec-
tion of Technical Information, 23 COMM. & L. 1 (2001) (surveying caselaw on 
dangerous information). 
 268. This distinction depends on the nature of their speech, not on the in-
stitutional status of Putnam or Jeppesen as the “press.” We are long past the 
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falsity has already been crossed—the only remaining argument 
is over what degree of fault the First Amendment requires. The 
same is true for search bias: false rankings made with actual 
malice may be actionable.269
C. SEARCH RANKINGS ARE FALSE WHEN THEY ARE DISHONEST 
 
Now we are in position to apply law to fact. The problem of 
falsity, it should be apparent, is a problem of baselines. To say 
that a ranking is “false,” we need some baseline of truth. The 
conduit, editor, and advisor theories diverge in the baselines 
 
era in which it made sense—if it ever did—to think of the institutional media 
as having a distinct and more protected First Amendment role. The Internet 
makes it possible for anyone to publish, cheaply and quickly. This Article, 
therefore, does not consider arguments that search engines are or are not 
“press” or “news media” or “publishers.” Instead, it looks to generally applica-
ble First Amendment doctrine. 
 269. Another case cited by Volokh and Falk is Blatty v. New York Times 
Co., 728 P.2d 1177 (Cal. 1986), in which the California Supreme Court held 
that an author could not sue the New York Times for allegedly leaving his 
book off its best-seller list. The court held that the list was not “of and concern-
ing” the plaintiff because it did not “refer to Blatty or his novel” expressly or 
by implication. Id. at 1185. Doctrinally, this is bizarre: “of and concerning” is 
not an element of tortious interference. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 766B (1979) (giving action for intentional improper interference); id. § 767 
(listing factors to determine whether interference is improper). The court im-
ported the of-and-concerning element from the defamation tort, believing that 
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), had constitutionalized the element. 
Blatty, 728 P.2d at 1182. But this misreads Rosenblatt, which was a defama-
tion case. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 77. Improper interference is its own well-
established tort, with its own doctrinal structure and its own safeguards. 
Whether they are constitutionally sufficient must be assessed on their own 
merits, rather than by converting improper interference into defamation by 
another name.  
Falsity and actual malice have been broadly constitutionalized, see, e.g., 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (intentional infliction 
of emotional distress); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 488 
(1984) (product disparagement), but not of-and-concerning, as the partial dis-
sent in Blatty noted. See Blatty, 728 P.2d at 1187–88 (Grodin, J., concurring 
and dissenting). The majority asserted that of-and-concerning applies “to all 
claims whose gravamen is the alleged injurious falsehood of a statement.” Id. 
at 1182. But this too is wrong. Consider another cause of action premised on 
injurious falsehood: false advertising. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act makes 
liable “[a]ny person who . . . in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepre-
sents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or 
another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). Thus, a competitor may sue for false 
statements about the plaintiff’s own products, even when the competitor is 
nowhere mentioned. See, e.g., TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc., 653 F.3d 
820, 826–28 (9th Cir. 2011) (competing driving school had Lanham Act stand-
ing to sue for the false suggestion that plaintiff’s website at dmv.org was affil-
iated with state agencies). 
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they choose. The conduit theory assumes that there is an objec-
tive baseline of relevance: it treats relevance as an objectively 
observable property of a website. The editor theory, by contrast, 
denies the possibility of any baseline at all: it treats relevance 
as a wholly subjective expression on the search engine’s part. 
The advisor theory, which recognizes that search rankings have 
both objective and subjective properties, charts a middle course. 
When a search engine is subjectively dishonest with its users—
when it returns results other than the ones it believes users 
will find the most relevant—the search engine’s own secret, 
undisclosed belief about relevance serves as the baseline 
against which the falsity of the rankings it actually returns can 
be measured. This Section takes up the three theories in turn. 
1. The Conduit Theory: Objective Falsity 
Start, once again, with the conduit theory. Google’s critics 
regularly assert that rankings are falsifiable because relevance 
is objective. Foundem, a price comparison website, claims, “[f]or 
the query ‘compare prices shoei xr-1000’, Foundem is one of on-
ly two or three truly relevant pages,”270 and “[i]t clearly makes 
no sense to exclude price comparison sites from these results 
[for searches like [best price canon eos 500d]].”271 These 
are claims that relevance for these queries is objectively deter-
minable, and that Google’s results are demonstrably wrong be-
cause they exclude Foundem. Kurt Wimmer argues that it 
could be misrepresentation for Google to claim “that its own 
services are the most relevant.”272 Nextag CEO Jeffrey Katz 
claims, “In addition, Google often uses its prime real estate to 
promote its own (often less relevant and inferior) products and 
services, prohibiting companies from buying its best advertise-
ments.”273
All of these arguments only make sense if relevance has an 
external reality, but it does not. The critics are probably right 
that the intentions behind some queries are reasonably unam-
 
 
 270. Foundem’s Google Story, supra note 129. 
 271. Google Penalty Myths, SEARCHNEUTRALITY.ORG (Nov. 19, 2009), 
http://www.searchneutrality.org/eu-launches-formal-investigation/myths 
-surrounding-google-penalties. 
 272. Kurt Wimmer, The Proper Standard for Constitutional Protection of 
Internet Search Practices 6 (unpublished white paper), available at http:// 
goo.gl/GkL0Y. 
 273. Katz, supra note 77. Nextag is a product search engine that competes 
with Google’s own product search service. 
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biguous.274
2. The Editor Theory: No Falsity 
 But this does not imply that the best results for 
those queries are similarly unambiguous. Some users will find 
Foundem easier to use and more helpful than Nextag; others 
will have the opposite reaction. Which of these product search 
sites should come up first in searches for [canon eos 500d 
compare prices]—or whether Google Shopping should—is 
not a question with a unique answer. The diversity of users’ 
preferences for most queries will tend to make the choice to 
rank one website over another nonfalsifiable. 
Now for the editor theory. The Search King court wrote 
that rankings are subjective “because every algorithm em-
ployed by every search engine is different, and will produce a 
different representation of the relative significance of a particu-
lar web site.”275
The difference matters because the two kinds of opinions 
are protected speech for different reasons and to very different 
extents. Normative opinions are protected speech because we 
have decided as a society to treat matters of taste and value as 
questions of individual conscience rather than objective agree-
ment. Elizabeth Hand says that Rick Moody is “one of our best 
writers,”
 Replace “relative significance of a particular 
web site” with “the number of jellybeans it would take to fill 
Soldier Field” and the fallacy is apparent. Search King could 
come to court with better math, and Google’s “representation” 
would be demonstrably false. Search King conflated users’ 
normative opinions about websites with search engines’ de-
scriptive opinions about which websites users will find rele-
vant. 
276
 
 274. See JORIS VAN HOBOKEN, SEARCH ENGINE FREEDOM: ON THE IMPLI-
CATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION FOR THE LEGAL GOVERN-
ANCE OF WEB SEARCH ENGINES 43–47 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed., 2012) (sug-
gesting that the possibility of “right” answers varies between navigational, 
transactional, and informational queries); Search Quality Rating Guidelines 
1.0, supra note 
 while Dale Peck says that he is “the worst writer of 
228, § 2.4, at 9 (same). 
 275. Search King v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 
21464568, at *3 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003). 
 276. Elizabeth Hand, Searching for Lost Time, WASH. POST, July 1, 2007, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/28/ 
AR2007062802184.html (reviewing RICK MOODY, RIGHT LIVELIHOODS: THREE 
NOVELLAS (2007)). 
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his generation.”277 Allowing them both to have their say re-
spects personal autonomy while promoting social pluralism.278
In contrast, freedom of expression for descriptive opinions 
is an instrumental goal: it helps encourage the creation of bet-
ter and more accurate knowledge about the world. Whether 
they are predictions about the future, like a weather report, or 
claims about presently existing but uncertain facts, like a 
hydrogeologist’s estimate of the reserves in an oil field, descrip-
tive opinions have in common that they are attempts to de-
scribe accurately the objective world as it is. As such, they can 
be wrong: they are capable of being disproven by the right evi-
dence, at least in principle.
 
279 That is, it is not the case that 
search rankings are absolutely protected speech because they 
express normative opinions. Instead, they enjoy only the weak-
er, more contingent protections afforded to descriptive opinions. 
A search engine does not itself have a normative opinion about 
which webpages are best; rankings do not express a search en-
gine’s own values.280 Google is not a book critic; when it links to 
Dale Peck’s hatchet job of a review, Google has no particular 
view about the truth of the matter asserted. It asserts only that 
users will find Peck’s review relevant. In practice, it will gener-
ally be impossible for a court to conclude that Google’s asser-
tions of relevance are wrong.281 But that is because of the diver-
sity of users’ (normative) opinions and the difficulty of 
measuring them, rather than because of the expressivity of 
Google’s (descriptive) opinions.282
 
 277. Peck, supra note 
 
237. 
 278. See Post, supra note 239, at 659 (“[A]ny government effort to penalize 
false judgments in public discourse would in effect use the force of the state to 
impose the standards of a specific community.”). 
 279. See Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs., 175 
F.3d 848, 853 (10th Cir. 1999) (endorsing, and garbling, the distinction); 
Kathyrn Dix Sowle, A Matter of Opinion: Milkovich Four Years Later, 3 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 467, 577–79 (1994) (endorsing this distinction). 
 280. Some search engines appear to interject their own tastes and values, 
such as SeekFind, whose mission is “to provide God-honoring, biblically based, 
and theologically sound Christian search engine results in a highly accurate 
and well-organized format.” SEEKFIND, http://www.seekfind.org (last visited 
Oct. 12, 2013). But SeekFind is really just a vertical search engine in disguise. 
SeekFind is not trying to impose its own Christian standard of relevance on 
non-Christians; it is trying to satisfy Christian users’ explicitly Christian 
standards of relevance. 
 281. See supra Part IV.C.1. 
 282. There is a helpful analogy to false advertising law. Any individual 
shopper’s preference for brand A over brand B is unverifiable. But a survey 
showing that four out of five shoppers preferred brand A to brand B is verifia-
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3. The Advisor Theory: Subjective Falsity 
The advisor theory leads us in a slightly different direction. 
Since we are concerned about loyalty, we should worry most 
about cases in which the search engine deliberately falls short 
of the best it is capable of for users. That is, we are looking for 
search rankings that depart from the search engine’s own as-
sessment of relevance. Milkovich explains the crucial doctrinal 
distinction in tort: 
For instance, the statement, “I think Jones lied,” may be provable as 
false on two levels. First, that the speaker really did not think Jones 
had lied but said it anyway, and second that Jones really had not lied. 
It is, of course, the second level of falsity which would ordinarily serve 
as the basis for a defamation action, though falsity at the first level 
may serve to establish malice where that is required for recovery.283
In a search ranking, the second-level statement (“this website 
is not relevant”) is unprovable and unfalsifiable. But the im-
plicit first-level statement (“[Google believes] this website is not 
relevant”) is false where Google believes otherwise. A classic 
English fraud case, Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, put the point 
quite nicely: 
 
There must be a misstatement of an existing fact, but the state of a 
man’s mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion. It is true 
that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a man’s mind at a 
particular time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much a fact as 
anything else. A misrepresentation as to the state of a man’s mind is, 
therefore, a misstatement of fact.284
One might ask why subjective falsity should ever matter. 
In many cases, it does not—it is not material to listeners. 
Whether a normative opinion is subjectively true or false is ir-
relevant as a matter of law. Even though “I hate broccoli” 
might be a lie, to let that lie form the basis of liability would 
undo the right to dislike broccoli. Subjective falsity is also irrel-
 
 
ble. Only the latter will serve as sufficient basis to establish a comparative 
claim; only the latter is subject to judicial second-guessing. The preferences 
themselves are still subjective, but it is possible to make objective statements 
that the consumers, in aggregate, have those preferences. See, e.g., Johnson & 
Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 
2002) (considering objective survey evidence about subjective consumer pref-
erences). The problem in search is that “Crest.com is relevant” is a far vaguer 
statement than “consumers prefer Crest.” 
 283. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 n.7 (1990); see also 
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1092 (1991) (“Such 
statements [of reasons, opinions, or beliefs] are factual in two senses: as 
statements that the directors do act for the reasons given or hold the belief 
stated and as statements about the subject matter of the reason or belief ex-
pressed.”). 
 284. Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, (1885) 29 Ch.D. 459 at 483 (Eng.).  
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evant where a descriptive opinion is objectively true. For exam-
ple, it does not typically suffice to make a statement actionable 
under the securities laws.285 Subjective falsity standing alone is 
immaterial to investors who care about the objective reality the 
statement describes.286
There is, however, an important category of descriptive 
opinions for which subjective falsity is highly important, be-
cause it can be bootstrapped into a form of objective falsity. 
Where a speaker holds herself out as having special expertise 
in the subject matter, she represents that her descriptive opin-
ions are the product of superior skill and judgment.
 
287
There is a particularly illuminating analogy between 
search rankings and credit ratings: both are numerical state-
ments about quality that combine a huge amount of knowledge 
about the world into a single, ambiguous statement.
 Where 
her relationship to listeners is sufficiently close to invite reli-
ance, the result is not unlike an estoppel. Her own secret un-
disclosed beliefs provide a baseline against which the truth of 
her statements can be measured.  
288 Because 
a rating is only a prediction about the probability of default, 
and because that probability is expressed on a non-numerical 
scale, it is difficult or impossible to prove a credit rating objec-
tively false.289
 
 285. See Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1096; Couture, supra note 
 But this fact has not deterred courts from allow-
236 
(endorsing this rule). 
 286. See Couture, supra note 236 (criticizing courts’ “unsound materiality 
analyses” in falsity cases). 
 287. See, e.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 768 (Cal. 1992) 
(“Moreover, when a party possesses or holds itself out as possessing superior 
knowledge or special information or expertise regarding the subject matter 
and a plaintiff is so situated that it may reasonably rely on such supposed 
knowledge, information, or expertise, the defendant's representation may be 
treated as one of material fact.”). 
 288. The missing link between Search King and Milkovich is actually a 
credit rating case, Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s 
Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999). Search King cites Milkovich only by 
way of embedded quotations from Jefferson County. Others who have noted 
the connection between search engines and credit-rating agencies include 
Mark Patterson, Manipulation of Product Ratings: Credit-Rating Agencies, 
Google, and Antitrust, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Apr. 2012, and Andrew Car-
roll, Don’t Be Evil . . . Unless It Increases Revenue: What the Operation of Cred-
it Rating Agencies Can Teach Us About Google, 31 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & 
ENVTL. L. 93 (2012). 
 289. See, e.g., Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Investors Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 
520, 529 (6th Cir. 2007) (“A Moody’s credit rating is a predictive opinion, de-
pendent on a subjective and discretionary weighing of complex factors. We find 
no basis upon which we could conclude that the credit rating itself communi-
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ing some suits against credit rating agencies.290 The key is bad 
faith.291 An actionable rating is not merely a bad prediction in 
light of how things turned out or in light of the evidence availa-
ble, but one affirmatively given in knowing or reckless violation 
of the rater’s own standards.292 These ratings are “false” be-
cause the rating agency has promised that they honestly repre-
sent its estimate of creditworthiness—but they do not.293
When a rating agency issues a rating, it is not merely a statement of 
that agency’s unsupported belief, but rather a statement that the rat-
ing agency has analyzed data, conducted an assessment, and reached 
a fact-based conclusion as to creditworthiness. If a rating agency 
knowingly issues a rating that is either unsupported by reasoned 
analysis or without a factual foundation, it is stating a fact-based 
opinion that it does not believe to be true.
 As one 
court explained, 
294
Credit ratings exist at all and are relied on by investors pre-
cisely because they express the best available proxy for an un-
observable aspect of reality: the rating agency’s judgment. 
Thus, in credit-ratings cases, subjective honesty is all. Norma-
tively, if a credit rating is subjectively false, it is worthless, and 
the arguments that it is worth protecting or plays a valuable 
role in the financial markets vanish. And doctrinally, subjective 
 
 
cates any provably false factual connotation.”). 
 290. See, e.g., Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 799 
(N.D. Cal. 2011); Abu Dhabi Com. Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. 
Supp. 2d 155, 175–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 291. See, e.g., King Cnty. v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 751 F. Supp. 
2d 652, 664–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“I have already ruled that plaintiffs stated a 
claim for fraud against Fitch, which means plaintiffs have adequately pled 
that (1) Fitch did not ‘genuinely and reasonably believe’ the ratings it issued 
or that (2) those ratings were ‘without basis in fact’—i.e., that they did not 
‘hold the opinions expressed by the ratings.’” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 292. Compare Anschutz, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 824 (“TAC may bring negligent 
misrepresentation claims against the Rating Agencies if plaintiff alleges that 
the Agencies did not honestly entertain the opinions about the ratings at the 
time they were issued.”), with Plumbers Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. 
Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp., 632 F.3d 762, 775 (1st Cir. 2011) (dismissing 
misrepresentation claim because “tellingly, the complaint stops short of alleg-
ing expressly that the leadership of S & P or Moody's believed that their com-
panies’ ratings were false or were unsupported by models that generally cap-
tured the quality of the securities being rated”). 
 293. See In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 48 (1st Cir. 
2005) (“In cases premised on misstatements of opinion, however, the falsity 
element, at a minimum, entails an inquiry into whether the statement was 
subjectively false . . . .”).  
 294. Abu Dhabi Com. Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 431, 
455 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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falsity marks the dividing line that suffices to make a bad-faith 
rating actionable.295
And so back to search results. Google holds out to the 
world that its rankings attempt to maximize relevance.
  
296 In-
deed, the head of Google’s search ranking team wrote, “[o]ur al-
gorithms rank results based only on what the most relevant 
answers are for users.”297 In pursuing this broad goal, Google, 
like the ratings agencies, is free to establish its own criteria for 
measuring and describing quality.298
 
 295. See Letter from Laurence H. Tribe & Thomas C. Goldstein to Sec. and 
Exch. Comm’n 4 (Dec. 14, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7 
-24-09/s72409-13.pdf (“But [nationally recognized statistical rating organiza-
tions (NRSROs)] are not altogether immune from suit, for the First Amend-
ment does not preclude the imposition of liability for a factual misstatement in 
a rating publication (including the fact that the NRSRO believes a certain rat-
ing opinion) if it is made with actual malice . . . .” (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); cf. Letter from Eugene Volokh to the Subcomm. on 
Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enter. of the House Comm. on Fin. 
Servs. (May 15, 2009), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/ 
file/hearings/111/volokh.pdf (calling credit ratings “pure opinion”). For further 
academic analyses applying the First Amendment to credit ratings, see, for 
example, Caleb Deats, Talk That Isn’t Cheap: Does the First Amendment Pro-
tect Credit Rating Agencies’ Faulty Methodologies from Regulation?, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 1818 (2010); Parisa Haghshenas, Obstacles to Credit Rating 
Agencies’ First Amendment Defense in Light of Abu Dhabi, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. 
REV. 452 (2010); Jonathan W. Heggen, Not Always the World’s Shortest Edito-
rial: Why Credit-Rating-Agency Speech Is Sometimes Professional Speech, 96 
IOWA L. REV. 1745 (2011); Gregory Husisian, What Standard of Care Should 
Govern the World’s Shortest Editorials?: An Analysis of Bond Rating Agency 
Liability, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 410 (1990); Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization 
and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1689–91 (2008); Theresa Nagy, Note, Credit Rating 
Agencies and the First Amendment: Applying Constitutional Journalistic Pro-
tections to Subprime Mortgage Litigation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 140 (2009); Ulrich 
G. Schroeter, Three Letters That Move the Markets: Credit Ratings Between 
Market Information and Legal Regulation, J. APPLIED RES. ACCT. & FIN., July 
2011, at 14. 
 It is not free, however, to 
assert that it has attempted to maximize quality when it has 
 296. See Schmidt Testimony, supra note 16, at 14 (“At all times, Google’s 
primary motivation has been improving the search experience for our users by 
providing the most relevant and useful information in response to their que-
ries.”). 
 297. Singhal, supra note 223. 
 298. In particular, it will usually be free to make either choice when it has 
to choose between results that will satisfy some users and results that will sat-
isfy others. Even though Google knows that some users prefer Nextag and 
others prefer Foundem, distinguishing them and giving them each what they 
want will be difficult or impossible. Subjective dishonesty arises only when the 
search engine, by its own lights, concludes that it really “ought” to return 
Nextag and returns Foundem instead. 
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not actually done so.299 That is a false statement of fact, one 
implicitly embedded in every ranking it utters that is based on 
something other than relevance. Determining whether Google 
believes its search rankings, of course, requires looking at its 
surveys of user relevance assessments, its internal treatment of 
those surveys, and its procedures for translating those assess-
ments into search rankings.300
What is more, the bad faith in misrepresenting the process 
by which search results are generated can also suffice to 
demonstrate the necessary fault. Consider again the quoted 
passage from Milkovich. If Google does not believe the rankings 
it provides to a user, this is “falsity at the first level”—the 
equivalent of a “speaker [who] really did not think Jones had 
lied but said it anyway.”
 
301 But as the Court noted, this dishon-
esty “may serve to establish malice.”302
 
 299. In theory, the falsehood could be either general (because the ranking 
criteria Google uses are not an honest attempt to implement relevance), or 
specific (because a given ranking did not actually result from the application of 
those criteria). In practice, however, the distinction collapses, as described in 
Part IV.D infra. Since no significant consequences turn on it, it is better not to 
attempt the difficult exercise in line-drawing involved. 
 It is precisely because 
the speaker has direct access to her own beliefs that a false 
statement about them is knowingly false. So too with a search 
engine. If Google deliberately changes its rankings to make 
them less relevant, the results are not just false, but knowingly 
false. If Google changes its rankings with deliberate indiffer-
ence to relevance and the results are in fact less relevant by its 
usual standards, they are not just false, but recklessly false. Ei-
ther way, subjective bad faith in reporting rankings constitutes 
actual malice. This is an important convergence. The combina-
tion of subjectivity and objectivity in a search ranking mean 
 300. If this sounds like a difficult exercise, consider that it may still be an 
easier hill to scale than objective falsity. See generally Rebecca Tushnet, It De-
pends on What the Meaning of “False” Is: Falsity and Misleadingness in Com-
mercial Speech Doctrine, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 227 (2007) (discussing the diffi-
culty in making judgments about the objective falsity of advertisements). It 
may also be difficult for private plaintiffs to frame a complaint that complies 
with Rule 11 and alleges sufficient facts to provide a plausible inference of 
subjective dishonesty: the relevant facts about a search engine’s relevance as-
sessments and algorithms will typically be closely guarded secrets within the 
search engine’s possession. FTC oversight, including FTC subpoena power, 
may be necessary if one is committed to stamping out subjective falsity. See 
James Grimmelmann, Devils and Details, THE LABORATORIUM (Jan. 4, 2013, 
1:21 AM), http://laboratorium.net/archive/2013/01/04/devils_and_details. Some 
readers may not consider the game to be worth the candle. 
 301. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 n.7 (1990). 
 302. Id. 
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that falsity and fault are not just connected, but coextensive. 
The same facts that establish one establish the other. 
This analysis does not depend on the fact that Google ex-
plicitly embraces relevance as its goal. The social practice of 
search is oriented around relevance: even in the absence of ex-
plicit claims, users would reasonably assume that Google is not 
deliberately hiding relevant results. Defamation law takes the 
common-sense position that speakers ordinarily have bases for 
their statements, so a statement of “opinion” with no stated ba-
sis may sometimes be treated as implicitly asserting the exist-
ence of some underlying facts sufficient to warrant the opin-
ion.303
How far can explicit disclaimers go? Could Google draft a 
disclaimer that would entirely exonerate it from deception-
based claims like tortious interference? Search without rele-
vance is pointless, so a complete disclaimer of relevance would 
be self-evidently false. Rather, to be effective, a disclaimer 
would need to affirmatively reveal the other considerations en-
tering into a ranking, such as legal compliance, protection of 
good morals, or the desire to crush Larry Page’s enemies, see 
them driven before him, and hear the lamentations of their 
women. 
 So too with search. Users would naturally expect that the 
search engine has a relevance-related justification for returning 
the results it does and not others.  
*  *  *   
To recap, the conduit theory goes wrong because it treats 
relevance as a fact about websites and ignores users’ normative 
opinions of websites. The editor theory goes wrong because it 
conflates users’ normative opinions about websites with search 
engines’ descriptive opinions about which websites users will 
find relevant. In contrast, the advisor theory of relevance—a 
descriptive opinion about users’ normative opinions of web-
site—yields a straightforward test based on loyalty to the user. 
A search ranking is actionable in tort when it is subjective-
ly dishonest.304
 
 303. See, e.g., TMJ Implants, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 498 F.3d 1175, 1183–87 
(10th Cir. 2007) (discussing the Restatement test in detail and concluding, 
“[i]n sum, we find little difference between 
 A ranking is meaningfully false when it is given 
§ 566 and the Milkovich standard”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977).  
 304. The following is a sketch of how the analysis of regulations designed 
to protect search users’ interests as active listeners may be slightly different. 
It is offered tentatively, as a starting point for discussion. 
In Search King-style suits, the basis for liability is deception. But just as 
consumer-protection and false advertising law can go beyond deceptive state-
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in knowing or reckless disregard of the search engine’s own in-
ternal standards for evaluating users’ relevance judgments. 
Such bad-faith rankings will also automatically satisfy 
Milkovich’s actual-malice standard of fault. Falsity and fault 
converge for search results. This is an attractive compromise be-
tween the editor theory, which asserts that rankings can never 
be false, and the conduit theory, which treats falsity as trivial 
when it bothers to worry about falsity at all. 
D. ALGORITHMS ARE A RED HERRING 
Some commentators would say that the entire above anal-
ysis is misguided because no human communication is involved 
at all. They believe it makes a significant difference that Google 
uses computers to generate its search results. They are 
wrong.305
Tim Wu argues in yet another New York Times op-ed about 
Google that “computerized decisions” should not be considered 
speech.
 
306 Comparing search results to GPS route suggestions, 
Microsoft Word spell-checking, and Facebook friend sugges-
tions, he explains that “computer programs are utilitarian in-
struments meant to serve us” whereas the First Amendment “is 
intended to protect actual humans against the evil of state cen-
sorship.”307
  The line can be easily drawn: as a general rule, nonhuman or au-
tomated choices should not be granted the full protection of the First 
Amendment, and often should not be considered “speech” at all. 
 He concludes: 
 
ments to misleading ones, even where the statements are purportedly ex-
plained away in the fine print, so too search regulation could reasonably pro-
hibit practices that reduce relevance, even where they are purportedly dis-
closed in the fine print. As with commercial speech, search rankings are 
covered speech because of their value to listeners, and regulations to protect 
those listeners are consistent with the level of protection they enjoy. If this is 
right, then the government could make a prima facie case for a regulation by 
showing that the practice it prevents is not directed to improving relevance for 
users, shifting an evidentiary burden to search engines to show that it has 
(possibly longer-term) sufficient relevance-improving effects.  
Thus, relevance could potentially provide a baseline against which ma-
nipulation, and not just deception, could be defined. But this would require 
care—more care than most of Google’s critics have taken—and the doctrinal 
details would be subtle. Given the closure of the FTC’s investigation, it is a 
subject for another day. 
 305. See generally Benjamin, supra note 220 (arguing that many “algo-
rithm-based outputs” are speech for First Amendment purposes). 
 306. Tim Wu, Op-Ed., Free Speech for Computers?, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 
2012, at A29. 
 307. Id. 
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(Where a human does make a specific choice about specific content, 
the question is different.)308
Wu’s argument misses the nature of the (very human) 
opinions expressed in search results, because it slights the idea 
that opinions can be expressed through automated processes.
 
309
This is not a meaningful distinction when thinking about 
search results. Suppose that Larry Page programs a computer 
to respond “Try Bobo’s Drive-In” whenever a user types in 
[food]. In Wu’s terms, this is a “specific choice about specific 
content” made repeatedly; it walks and quacks like speech. The 
same reasoning applies to any other up-front programming 
choice that has numerous predictable consequences: directing 
users to restaurants’ own webpages over review sites (or vice-
versa), directing GPS users to take arterial roads rather than 
side streets (or vice-versa), or directing the friend suggester not 
to suggest as friends people currently in a relationship with us-
ers’ exes. Whether or not each of these decisions is speech, algo-
rithmically multiplying its consequences a millionfold should 
not change the answer. 
 
If Google consisted of Larry Page sitting at a computer person-
ally typing out answers to users’ queries, his responses would 
constitute protected speech. The actual Google differs because 
Page and his employees have written a complicated computer 
program that takes users’ queries as its input and produces 
search results as its output. 
Nor can “the algorithm” be used as a baseline from which 
any deviation is impermissible deception.310
 
 308. Id. 
 There is no mean-
 309. For versions of this reply to Wu, see Timothy B. Lee, Do You Lose Free 
Speech Rights If You Speak Using a Computer?, ARS TECHNICA (June 22, 
2012, 11:15 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/06/do-you-lose-free 
-speech-rights-if-you-speak-using-a-computer/; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of 
Speech and Information Produced Using Computer Algorithms, VOLOKH CON-
SPIRACY (June 21, 2012, 11:59 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/06/21/ 
freedom-of-speech-and-information-produced-using-computer-algorithms/. For 
a more comprehensive treatment of the algorithmic speech question, see Ben-
jamin, supra note 220; see also Bruce Boyden, Speech by Proxy, MADISONIAN 
(June 25, 2012), http://madisonian.net/2012/06/25/speech-by-proxy. Even Tim 
Wu has since endorsed a narrower and more careful theory of algorithmic 
speech. See Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1530–31 (2013) 
(recognizing that “Google is just trying to find what the user wants” and en-
dorsing a First Amendment test that “[t]he law in question must somehow 
burden a search engine’s users”). This is not quite complete—it leaves out the 
way in which Google communicates valuable opinions about relevance to us-
ers—but it recognizes the crucial role played by search users. 
 310. See, e.g., Grimmelmann, supra note 1, at 59–60 (describing “strong 
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ingful dividing line between algorithmic and manual search re-
sults. Every search result is produced algorithmically; it’s algo-
rithms all the way down. Compare two cases involving Google’s 
responses to rankings manipulation. In November 2010, the 
New York Times reported on DecorMyEyes, an online glasses 
vendor that cheated its customers and then deliberately offend-
ed them when they complained, knowing that they would post 
furious reviews—thereby tricking Google into thinking that 
DecorMyEyes was a popular site.311 In February 2011, the same 
reporter caught a much bigger fish: J.C. Penney.312 The retailer 
had engaged in “the most ambitious attempt” at gaming Google 
an industry expert had ever seen, buying thousands of links to 
JCPenney.com from unrelated websites. Google “developed an 
algorithmic solution” to detect and demote hundreds of mer-
chants like DecorMyEyes that “provide an extremely poor user 
experience.”313 In contrast, Google took individual “manual ac-
tion” against J.C. Penney, dropping its website from the num-
ber-one result for “living room furniture” to number sixty-
eight.314
E. CONCLUSION: THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION GETS IT 
MOSTLY RIGHT 
 There is no meaningful difference between the cases: 
relevance is the real issue, not algorithmic versus manual 
ranking. 
When the FTC closed its search-bias investigation into 
Google, it seems to have acted consistently with its mission as a 
consumer-protection agency and recognized that Google’s users 
were the real parties in (the public) interest. The FTC’s official 
statement explained, in essence, that Google’s results are not 
subjectively false because Google’s algorithms are a good-faith 
effort to maximize user relevance: 
The totality of the evidence indicates that, in the main, Google adopt-
ed the design changes that the Commission investigated to improve 
the quality of its search results, and that any negative impact on ac-
tual or potential competitors was incidental to that purpose. . . . 
 
intuitive appeal” of manual manipulation argument). 
 311. David Segal, A Bully Finds a Pulpit on the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 
2010, at BU1. 
 312. David Segal, The Dirty Little Secrets of Search, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
2011, at BU1. 
 313. Amit Singhal, Being Bad to Your Customers Is Bad for Business, 
GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Dec. 1, 2010), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/ 
being-bad-to-your-customers-is-bad-for.html. 
 314. Segal, supra note 312. 
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  While Google’s prominent display of its own vertical search results 
on its search results page had the effect in some cases of pushing oth-
er results “below the fold,” the evidence suggests that Google’s prima-
ry goal in introducing this content was to quickly answer, and better 
satisfy, its users’ search queries by providing directly relevant infor-
mation.315
Google’s critics were outraged, but this was probably the right 
result. The FTC asked the right question (“Did Google adjust 
its algorithms for the purpose of sending users to less relevant 
sites?”) and came to a defensible answer (“No.”).  
 
The advisor theory’s focus on falsity, which necessarily re-
quires an evaluation of the search engine’s good faith, explains 
the FTC’s otherwise surprising turn toward considering mo-
tives.316 Its analysis seems to slide back and forth between dis-
cussion of Google’s motives and the effects on consumers. But 
the two are inextricably linked; Google acted in good faith be-
cause its own studies showed that the changes benefitted users. 
“Reasonable minds may differ” about search results, the FTC 
wrote, and its decision properly preserved a safe space for de-
ductive opinions about relevance.317
Indeed, many of Google’s seemingly problematic practices 
can be defended, sometimes quite convincingly, as good-faith 
enhancements to relevance. The penalty that Google applied to 
Foundem and other price-comparison sites reduces the promi-
nence of dozens of me-too sites with little to distinguish one 
from another. The same goes for Google’s decisions to devote 
front-page search space to Google+, Universal Search, and 
Knowledge Graph results. Google can quite reasonably believe 
that integrating its affiliated sites into results is relevance-
improving overall. One may disagree—the present author 
thinks that the Google+ integration is bad for users and bad for 
Google—without believing that these decisions, on the evidence 
available, amount to bad faith.  
 
 
 315. Statement of the Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 5, at 2 (emphasis 
added). 
 316. The FTC added that the changes probably benefitted consumers, but 
it is striking that the Commission put the intent first and made the actual ef-
fects the corollary. To underscore the anomaly of this approach, consider that 
some of Google’s strongest antitrust defenders are also fierce critics of the use 
of intent evidence in antitrust cases. Compare Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. 
Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case Against the Case Against 
Google, 34 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 171 (2011) (three cheers for Google), with 
Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Innovation and the Limits of Anti-
trust, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 153 (2010) (three jeers for intent evidence). 
 317. Statement of the Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 5, at 3. 
  
936 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:868 
 
If there is a fly in the ointment, it is that while the FTC 
pledged to “remain vigilant and continue to monitor Google”318 
it did not give much thought as to how to carry out its monitor-
ing. Since search bias claims hinge on Google’s honesty in fol-
lowing its own processes, an outside observer will rarely have 
the necessary information to reliably conclude that something 
fishy is taking place. Only the FTC, with its subpoena power, is 
well positioned to look “under the hood.”319 Dropping the com-
plaint entirely, as the FTC did, abdicates that responsibility. 
Some kind of regular ongoing opening up of the algorithms is 
the most effective way to keep Google loyal. Given Google’s size 
and significance, the FTC should have given more thought to 
setting a continuing compliance regime—like the ones that 
credit rating agencies are required to have in place.320
V.  OTHER APPLICATIONS   
 This isn’t 
just about Google: Bing is big enough, and potentially bad 
enough, that it ought to have ongoing oversight too. 
The advisor theory is useful well beyond search bias. 
Google’s critics allege that it infringes copyright on an epic 
scale, tramples user privacy, smears the innocent, and kicks 
puppies for fun. Google, needless to say, sees matters rather 
differently. On the company’s account, it is guilty only of offer-
ing the best search results on the web, bar none. The advisor 
theory helps sort problematic practices from benign ones. This 
Part gives brief sketches of four other legal controversies 
around search. It does not offer comprehensive analyses of any 
of the controversies; that will need to wait for future work. In-
stead, it shows how access and loyalty—the key prescriptions of 
the advisor theory—bring fresh insights to well-worn disputes. 
 
 318. Id. at 4. 
 319. Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 56, at 1202. 
 320. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(3) (2012) (requiring each NRSRO to “estab-
lish, maintain, enforce, and document an effective internal control structure 
governing the implementation of and adherence to policies, procedures, and 
methodologies for determining credit ratings”); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-2 (2013) 
(imposing record-keeping requirements on registered NRSROs); id. § 240.17g-
6(a)(2)–(3) (prohibiting an NRSRO from “[i]ssuing . . . a rating that is not de-
termined in accordance with the nationally recognized statistical rating organ-
ization's established procedures and methodologies” in certain cases involving 
a potential conflict of interest); see also Carroll, supra note 288, at 116–18 (en-
dorsing Dodd-Frank-ization of Google). 
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A. COPYRIGHT 
Google dreams big, and none of its dreams are bigger than 
its plan to scan every book ever published.321 Not the driverless 
cars.322 Not the virtual-reality glasses.323 Not even the prize to 
land a robot on the moon.324 No, Google Books—a program regu-
larly compared to a modern Library of Alexandria—best cap-
tures the company’s ambition and arrogance.325 Google borrows 
physical books from libraries and digitizes them, then feeds the 
texts into its search engine, which tells users who wrote that, 
and on what page. So far, Google is up to about 20 million 
books.326 The program has drawn four separate lawsuits by au-
thors and publishers for copyright infringement.327
The conduit theory would say that since search is a vehicle 
for websites and other publishers to be found, it follows that 
they ought to be findable on their own terms. A search engine 
should be required to index them when they want to be includ-
ed; and required not to index them when they want to be ex-
cluded. On this view, Google Books should have been confined 
to voluntary agreements with authors and publishers. And the 
editor theory is ambiguous. A newspaper exercises editorial 
judgment in choosing comics and columnists—but it needs 
permission from the authors of both to print them. On the other 
hand, when the newspaper reports on goings on around town, it 
is organizing and delivering content of its own, not simply re-
packaging the content of the art galleries and theaters. On this 
 These are 
lawsuits over indexing: their goal is to stop Google from putting 
content in its search index without the provider’s permission. 
 
 321. See Jeffrey Toobin, Google’s Moon Shot, NEW YORKER, Feb. 5, 2007, at 
30. 
 322. See John Markoff, Google Cars Drive Themselves, in Traffic, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2010, at A1. 
 323. See Nick Bilton, A Rose-Colored View May Come Standard, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 5, 2012, at B3. 
 324. See John Schwartz, $25 Million in Prizes Is Offered for Trip to Moon, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2007, at A14. 
 325. See Sergey Brin, Op-Ed., A Library to Last Forever, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
9, 2009, at A31. 
 326. See Jennifer Howard, Google Begins to Scale Back Its Scanning of 
Books from University Libraries, CHRON. HIGHER ED., Mar. 9, 2012, http:// 
chronicle.com/article/Google-Begins-to-Scale-Back/131109/. 
 327. See Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); 
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Authors Guild 
v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Complaint, McGraw-Hill 
Cos. et al. v. Google, No. 05-cv-08881, 2005 WL 2778878 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 
2005). 
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latter view, Google Books is a wholly new product, one distinct 
from the books it scans.328
The advisor theory comes down decisively in favor of index-
ing. Users’ interests cut uniformly in favor of maximizing the 
universe of searchable information. Indexing is purely an issue 
of access: a search engine never acts disloyally by indexing 
more content. A provider who insists on structuring how users 
learn about its information is, in essence, taking control of the 
search process through vertical integration. This limits users’ 
choices among search technology—and directly inhibits their 
ability to compare among providers. There is rarely a good rea-
son for a speaker to be willing to share its speech with listeners 
while preventing them from knowing about it. Taking the us-
er’s point of view emphasizes the enormous societal gains from 
searchability: entirely new ways of finding and learning from 
works become possible.
 
329
Thus, the advisor theory is even more radically pro-
indexing than the editor theory. For search engines, indexing is 
a business decision; for users, it is an essential precondition to 
informational freedom. Indeed, there is a strong argument that 
information has not been meaningfully “published” until it is 
made searchable. This is the position taken by patent law: a 
thesis in a library does not qualify as prior art until it is not 
just physically accessible to the public but properly indexed.
 
330
One important exception may be privacy. Think of a father 
who puts photographs of his daughter online and emails the 
link to family members for sharing with their friends, but who 
prefers not to have the pictures show up in search engines.
 
For copyright purposes, anything openly published should be 
searchable. That requires a blanket privilege to copy for the 
purposes of indexing, and a privilege to show excerpts to users 
to help them decide whether to follow up on search results by 
consulting the original. 
331
 
 328. See Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1607 (2009) (endorsing broad fair-use protections for such technolo-
gies). 
 A 
 329. See Matthew Sag, Orphan Works as Grist for the Data Mill, 27 BERK. 
TECH. L.J. 1503 (2012). 
 330. Compare In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (thesis indexed 
only by title on index card in shoebox is not a “printed publication”), with In re 
Hall, 781 F.2d 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (thesis indexed in library catalog is a 
“printed publication”). 
 331. See Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and “Blurry-Edged” Social 
Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1315 (2009); Woodrow Hartzog & Fred Stutzman, 
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privacy exception, however, makes less sense for books than it 
does for webpages. Google offers authors and publishers an opt-
out from book scanning,332 just as it offers websites an opt-out 
from its main search engine.333
Two recent decisions show how fair use can be calibrated to 
accommodate indexing. In Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, it 
was a fair use for Google’s partner libraries to use their copies 
of the scanned books to create their own search engine.
 It’s not clear that Google needs 
to offer opt-outs for books, or that it should. 
334 But 
in Associated Press v. Meltwater Holdings, Inc., it was not a fair 
use for a news monitoring service to send reports to its sub-
scribers containing substantial excerpts from news stories pub-
lished on the web.335 Both drew on a line of cases finding that 
search engines make transformative fair uses of the material 
they index because the search engine serves a different purpose 
than the works it describes.336 The purpose is only different 
from the user’s point of view: she consults the search engine to 
find the works, and consults the works themselves to experi-
ence and understand them. The HathiTrust court embraced the 
search-engine cases, saying it “cannot imagine a definition of 
fair use that would not encompass the transformative uses 
made by” the libraries.337 But the Meltwater court held that 
Meltwater was not a search engine, because it was a “subscrip-
tion service” rather than a “publicly available tool”338 and be-
cause its searches were “run against a defined list of content 
providers” rather than the Internet as a whole.339
 
The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 35–37 (2013). 
 Both distinc-
tions are singularly unpersuasive: the court’s distinctions 
 332. See Information for Publishers and Authors About the Library Project, 
GOOGLE BOOKS, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/publisher_library.html 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2013). 
 333. See Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1112–13 (D. Nev. 2006) 
(stating that since Google cannot contact all website owners, they can “auto-
matically communicate their preferences” by putting “instructions in 
‘metatags’”). 
 334. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 104 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1659, 1669 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 335. Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 336. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1164–65 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (image thumbnails transformative); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 
F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003) (image thumbnails transformative); Field, 412 F. 
Supp. 2d, at 1118–19 (search engine cache transformative). 
 337. HathiTrust, 104 U.S.P.Q.2d, at 1675. 
 338. Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 554. 
 339. Id. at 555. 
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would require all search engines to support themselves with 
advertising and would prohibit vertical search entirely. 
The better distinction between the two cases has to do with 
how users employed the two services. Obtaining a list of books 
containing a search term is only the first step in the research 
process; to learn more, one must still obtain a copy and read 
the book. That’s precisely the kind of connection between au-
thors and readers that the copyright system encourages; it’s 
beyond perverse for authors to object that a search engine rec-
ommends their works. But the Associated Press made a plausi-
ble argument that Meltwater’s users were using its clippings as 
a substitute for reading the original stories; it had a click-
through rate of less than a tenth of a percent.340 The details are 
debatable, but the general principle Meltwater embraces is 
sound: search engines have a better fair use case when they 
help users find websites than when they merely republish web-
sites’ content.341
On November 14, 2013, as this Article was going through 
the final stages of editing for publication, the Southern District 
of New York held that it was also a fair use for Google to use its 
own scans to offer the Google Books search engine and to show 
“snippets” of one eighth of a page around each search result to 
users.
 
342 The court’s conclusion was consistent with the argu-
ment above: “snippets help users locate books and determine 
whether they may be of interest. . . . Google Books does not su-
persede or supplant books because it is not a tool to be used to 
read books.”343 The court concluded that Google Books “advanc-
es the progress of the arts and sciences, while maintaining re-
spectful consideration for the rights of authors and other crea-
tive individuals, and without adversely impacting the rights of 
copyright holders. . . . Indeed, all society benefits.”344
 
 340. Id. at 547. There are multiple reasons why this could be true, not all of 
them infringing. The court noted that Meltwater showed its users excerpts of 
up to 440 characters, representing between 4.5% and 61% of the AP’s articles. 
Id. at 545–47. But it did not persuasively explain whether the low click-
through-rate was attributable to Meltwater’s display of AP’s protectable ex-
pression, rather than because it was relaying the uncopyrightable underlying 
facts. 
 
 341. See id. at 552. 
 342. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8136 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 14, 2013). 
 343. Id. at *20–21. 
 344. Id. at *26. 
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B. PRIVACY 
Search is valuable, but it is not free. To generate individu-
ally meaningful results, the search engine requires access to 
the personal information that distinguishes one user from an-
other. The current query is just the tip of the iceberg: over time, 
a search engine can accumulate an extensive profile of a user’s 
interests. This intellectual history can be intensely personal 
and immensely revealing.345 Search privacy is therefore a sub-
ject of significant concern for consumer advocates; some search 
engines even compete by emphasizing that they retain less in-
formation on users.346
Neither the conduit nor the editor theory is much help 
here; their attention is elsewhere. Neither transmitting website 
speech nor curating a collection of links has any necessary con-
nection to user information. Thus, both theories treat any flow 
of information from the user to the search engine as a separate 
issue from the quality of search results. 
 
But on a user-centric view, user data takes center stage. It 
is the search query that defines search: with no query, the 
search engine has no question to answer. The very thing that 
makes search sensitive to user interests means that search en-
gines also acquire sensitive information about what users are 
interested in.347
 
 345. See, e.g., Michael Zimmer, Privacy on Planet Google: Using the Theory 
of “Contextual Integrity” to Clarify the Privacy Threats of Google’s Quest for the 
Perfect Search Engine, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 109, 112–14 (2008). The record-
holder here may be user “927,” whose imperfectly anonymized queries were 
released along with 650,000 others’ by AOL in a well-publicized 2006 scandal. 
See Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher 
No. 4417749, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at A1. This user’s queries included 
[cut into your trachea], [beauty and the beast beastility 
porn], [holocaust rape], [was abe lincoln gay], [intersexed 
genetails], and [low carb calorie foods]. Id. To read 927’s and other 
users’ query histories is to wince at the consequences if they were to be linked 
back to specific individuals. Which may be surprisingly easy. See generally 
Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure 
of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010) (explaining the ease of re-
identifying supposedly anonymous individuals). 
 There is no way to engineer a search engine 
that does not observe user interests. And from a user’s perspec-
 346. DuckDuckGo, for example, has a charming explanation of its policies 
against user tracking. DUCKDUCKGO, http://donttrack.us/ (last visited Nov. 
27, 2013). 
 347. Cf. Nathan Newman, The Cost of Lost Privacy: Search, Antitrust and 
the Economics of the Control of User Data (May 14, 2013) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2265026 (arguing that the exploitation of personal information is so central to 
Google’s business practices that it amounts to an antitrust violation). 
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tive, it is also a matter of some importance what is done with 
that information once it has been handed over to the search en-
gine. A search for [san jose jobs in sales] or [furry 
videos] could be embarrassing or worse in the wrong hands. 
Searches implicate intellectual privacy,348 which goes to the 
heart of users’ ability to lead autonomous self-directed lives by 
forming their own private opinions about the world.349 The 
freedom to think for oneself requires the freedom to read unob-
served,350
In agency terms, an agent has a duty not to misuse confi-
dential information supplied by the principal.
 which in turn requires the freedom to search unob-
served.  
351 This duty can 
be waived with properly informed consent, but the common-law 
baseline is that an agent or advisor in a fiduciary relationship 
must respect client confidences.352
This last point has important implications for the gold 
mine at the heart of Google’s advertising business, which is 
based on precisely targeted advertising.
 Thus, the debate over search 
user privacy ought to start from this baseline: query data and 
other data supplied by the user as part of obtaining search re-
sults are subject to a duty of confidentiality. Search engines 
may not transfer any of this data to third parties without in-
formed consent. Nor may they use it against the interests of 
their principals—search users—without informed consent. 
353
 
 348. See Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008). 
 Some of this target-
ing is valuable to users and valued by them: showing geograph-
ically targeted florist ads on a search for [flowers] is another 
way of improving relevance. But in its more comprehensive and 
intrusive forms, targeted advertising raises serious autonomy 
 349. See M. Zimmer, The Gaze of the Perfect Search Engine: Google as an 
Infrastructure of Dataveillance, in WEB SEARCH: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PER-
SPECTIVES 77, 77 (Amanda Spink & Michael Zimmer eds., 2008) (arguing that 
search engine surveillance of users “threaten[s] the values the perfect search 
engines were designed to sustain”). 
 350. See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at 
“Copyright Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996). 
 351. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05(2) (2005). 
 352. Id. § 8.06(1); see also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Infor-
mation Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from 
Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1058 (2000) (explaining that the 
government may impose confidentiality obligations on advisors who do not 
“explicitly disclaim any such implicit promise”). 
 353. Google had $43 billion in advertising revenue for its 2012 fiscal year. 
Investor Relations, GOOGLE, http://investor.google.com/financial/tables.html 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2013). 
  
2014] SPEECH ENGINES 943 
 
concerns; the fear is that advertisers reject the user’s reality 
and substitute their own.354
Everything hinges, therefore, on the degree to which users 
are aware of the tracking and targeting and are capable of ex-
ercising effective control over them. From a user autonomy per-
spective, the formalistic “consent” of using a website that has a 
hyperlink in small type to its privacy terms is a terrible proxy 
for meaningful choice.
 It is precisely the comprehensive 
user profiles that search engines are capable of accumulating in 
their ordinary course of operations that makes this outcome so 
troubling. 
355 A better world would feature what Er-
ic Goldman calls “Coasean filters”: tools that let users and 
marketers bargain over who receives which messages.356
C. DEFAMATION 
 But 
today’s online world is quite far from that ideal; stronger base-
line protections for user data and an ecology of effective and 
usable user-controlled privacy tools will be required to get clos-
er. 
Michael Trkulja would like you to know that he is not a 
gangster. He was merely minding his own business having din-
ner in a Melbourne restaurant when a balaclava-clad hit man 
shot him in the back.357 The shooting remains unsolved, and a 
website named Melbourne Crime posted Trkulja’s picture along 
with an article about the case from the Herald Sun Newspa-
per.358 That webpage also had photographs of other notorious 
criminals and alleged criminals359—implying, Trkulja claimed, 
that he was a member of Melbourne’s criminal underworld.360
 
 354. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You 
Cannot Refuse, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 294 (2012) (“[A]dvertisers do not 
see individuals as autonomous beings.”); Tal Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Busi-
ness!”: Making the Case for the Implications of the Data Mining of Personal 
Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003). 
 
 355. The British videogame chain GameStation takes the cake here: it 
added a term to its former website Terms and Conditions that “you agree to 
grant Us a non transferable option to claim, for now and for ever more, your 
immortal soul.” Marcperton, Read Fine Print or GameStation May Own 
Your Soul, CONSUMERIST (Apr. 16, 2010), http://consumerist.com/2010/04/16/ 
read-fine-print-or-gamestation-may-own-your-soul/ (discussing the immortal 
soul term). 
 356. Goldman, supra note 205, at 1213–18. 
 357. Trkulja v Google Inc., [2012] VSC 533 ¶ 4 (Austl.). 
 358. Trkulja v Yahoo! Inc., [2012] VSC 88 ¶¶ 2–4 (Austl.). 
 359. Id. ¶ 3. 
 360. Id. ¶ 5. 
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Trkulja sued Yahoo! for returning the Melbourne Crime page 
as a search result for [michael trkulja].361 Google had it 
even worse: an image search for [michael trkulja] returned 
the pictures of actual criminals from the Melbourne Crime 
page, but captioned with Trkulja’s name.362
This time it is the editor theory that argues for liability 
and the conduit theory that would exonerate the search engine, 
instead of vice versa. The conduit theory treats the search en-
gine as a blameless tool in the service of websites, and therefore 
pushes all of the responsibility for content off of the search en-
gine and on to websites. American law, in the form of section 
230 of the Communications Decency Act’s immunity for inter-
active computer services, adopts the conduit theory.
 
363
The editor theory, on the other hand, treats the search en-
gine as an active selector and arranger of content. A newspaper 
is typically responsible for the material it assembles into each 
day’s edition, whether that material came from its own report-
ers, a newswire, advertisers, or another source. So too with a 
search engine: it chooses which content to feature and has de-
tailed knowledge about that content. The website will frequent-
ly be unreachable or judgment-proof; the search engine is an 
equally culpable but more easily targeted speaker. The Austral-
ian courts followed the editor theory: the Supreme Court of Vic-
toria upheld Trkulja’s AU$ 225,000 judgment against Yahoo!
 Trkulja’s 
only recourse in the United States would be against Melbourne 
Crime, not against the search engines that linked to it. 
364 
and his AU$ 200,000 judgment against Google.365
Neither approach is quite correct. We should rather ask 
what users want from search in a world where not all infor-
mation is of equal value. A search engine can help by sorting 
truth from falsehood—but it can also help simply by helping 
 
 
 361. Id. ¶ 7. 
 362. Trkulja v Google Inc., [2012] VSC 533 ¶ 2 (Austl). 
 363. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). For cases applying Section 230 to immun-
ize search engines, see Getachew v. Google, Inc., 491 F. App’x 923 (10th Cir. 
2012); Neeley v. NameMedia Inc., No. 09-5151, 2011 BL 24617, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d 
2029 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 31, 2011); Maughan v. Google Tech., Inc., 143 Cal. App. 
4th 1242 (2006); Mmubango v. Google, Inc., No. 12-1300, 2013 WL 664231 
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2013); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 
2006); Stayart v. Google, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1056–57 (E.D. Wis. 2011); 
see also Metropolitan Int’l Schools Ltd. v. Designtechnica Corp., [2011] 1 WLR 
1743, [2009] EWHC 1765 (Q.B.) (finding Google not liable for allegedly defam-
atory statements in excerpt from website). 
 364. Trkulja v Yahoo! Inc., [2012] VSC 88 ¶ 60 (Austl). 
 365. Trkulja v Google Inc., [2012] VSC 533 ¶ 55 (Austl). 
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users find relevant information on a topic. This latter function 
is more basic: one cannot reliably draw accurate conclusions 
without access to the full range of data on a topic. When a 
search engine performs the latter role for its users—telling 
them what others have said—it does so without endorsing the 
truth of the content it excerpts or links to. A ranking is a guess 
that the user will find the content relevant, nothing more. Like 
a newspaper reporting on the controversy over public officials’ 
defamatory statements,366 a search engine performs a valuable 
service by telling its users about the existence of a debate in the 
first place.367
That is, the advisor theory reminds us that what is truly at 
stake is users’ access to information. A decision that certain 
content ought not to be indexed—because it is defamatory, be-
cause it is harassing, because it incites racial hatred, or be-
cause it will inevitably cause moral rot, tooth decay, and alien 
invasion—should be recognized for what it is: a decision by 
government to censor the information available to search users. 
Of course, there is a good reason for this censorship: defama-
tion law reflects a collective judgment that harmful lies about 
people ought not be repeated. But the collateral consequences 
of a duty on search engines to avoid defamatory results are 
likely to be especially severe.
 
368
But section 230 goes too far by providing search engines an 
absolute immunity for content supplied by websites, regardless 
of knowledge or intent.
 The crucial facts—whether the 
complained-of statements are true or false—are not typically 
likely to be in the possession of the search engine. And the sub-
tle shades of meaning involved in parsing allegedly defamatory 
statements make even the notoriously difficult task of as-
sessing fair use seem simple by comparison. Search engines 
need clear and well-sheltered safe harbors from defamation lia-
bility. 
369
 
 366. See Ashley Messenger, The Problem with New York Times, Co. v. Sul-
livan: An Argument for Moving from a “Falsity Model” of Libel Law to a 
“Speech Act Model,” 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 172, 177 (2012). 
 If Trkulja has sued Melbourne Crime 
 367. See Nieman v. Versuslaw, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-3104, 2012 BL 196699, 40 
Med. L. Rptr. 2191 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 03, 2012) (holding that the First Amend-
ment bars claims against search engines for linking to court documents). 
 368. See Felix Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary 
Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293 (2011) (discussing § 230 and the collat-
eral censorship problem); Grimmelmann, supra note 63 (arguing that the 
problem will be especially severe for search engines). 
 369. For an overview of proposals to modify section 230, see JOEL 
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and won, the argument for leaving Yahoo! and Google entirely 
alone is much weaker. The same is true if Melbourne Crime is 
unreachable because it is overseas or anonymous, or if the 
same false claims are repeated on so many websites that suing 
them individually is obviously infeasible. Search engines’ im-
munity should be limited when victims supply sufficiently sub-
stantiated proof that the linked-to material is defamatory.370 
And some search engines don’t even deserve this much protec-
tion. Imagine a search engine called the Scandal Rag that re-
sponds to every search query by linking to third-party page ac-
cusing Trkulja of murder and arson without a shred of proof. 
The Scandal Rag substitutes its own agenda for users’ goals; it 
has stepped out of the kind of role for which immunity makes 
sense. It is acting like a publisher, rather than an advisor, and 
the law should treat it as one.371
Censorship is one thing; secret censorship quite another.
 
372 
When the law requires search engines not to link to certain 
content, the very least it owes to users is an explanation. 
Google provides ready examples of what to do. When the Chi-
nese government required it not to return certain search re-
sults relating to the Tiananmen Square crackdown or to Falun 
Gong, Google decorated the Google.cn results pages that would 
have contained those links with a disclaimer warning that 
some results had been removed to comply with local laws.373
 
REIDENBERG ET AL., FORDHAM CTR. ON LAW & INFO. POLICY, SECTION 230 OF 
THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT: A SURVEY OF THE LEGAL LITERATURE 
AND REFORM PROPOSALS (2012). 
 
 370. In copyright, section 512 of the Digital Milennium Copyright Act lim-
its search engines’ immunity in just this way. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(3) (2012). 
But the threshold there is too low, because courts have interpreted the provi-
sion prohibiting bad-faith notices so narrowly that copyright owners can file 
takedown notices, even in cases of obvious fair use, with impunity. See Rossi v. 
Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., 391 F.3d 1000, 1004–05 (9th Cir. 2004) (inter-
preting Section 512 as setting a “subjective” standard, so that even unreason-
able beliefs about infringement can be the basis for takedown notices). A bet-
ter provision, in copyright and in defamation, would require that the 
complainant provide more evidence in the notice, and impose greater penalties 
for bad-faith or unreasonable notices. 
 371. Section 512(d) is a better model here. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1)(A) 
(2012) (denying safe harbor when information location tool has “actual 
knowledge that the material or activity is infringing”). 
 372. Cf. Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377, 393 (2009) (ar-
guing that Internet filtering is more legitimate when countries are transpar-
ent about what material is blocked and why).  
 373. See Grimmelmann, supra note 97, at 947–50; see also Alan Eustace, 
Better Search in Mainland China, GOOGLE INSIDE SEARCH (May 31, 2012, 
9:00 AM), http://insidesearch.blogspot.com/2012/05/better-search-in-mainland 
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And when Google receives copyright takedown notices under 
section 512(d) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA), it forwards them to the Chilling Effects clearinghouse 
to document the resulting removals.374 But Google also provides 
ready examples of what not to do. Starting in August 2012, it 
added a new signal, downgrading sites that received high num-
bers of DMCA takedown requests—even for content that had 
not been the subject of a DMCA notice.375 This move is neither 
required by copyright law376 nor relevance-enhancing from us-
ers’ perspective.377
D. TRADEMARK 
 If Google hides webpages it thinks users are 
looking for, it should be honest with them and say on the 
search results page that it has done so. 
According to Google, [rosetta stone] has many mean-
ings. It refers to the Rosetta Stone, the Egyptian stele that 
made it possible to decipher hieroglyphs. It refers to the well-
known line of language-learning software identified by the 
ROSETTA STONE trademark. And it refers to a wide range of 
online sites where one can buy language-learning software—
some of it authorized ROSETTA STONE software, some of it 
not. This last category is responsible for all of the trouble.378
There is a long-running battle between trademark owners 
and search engines over keyword advertising—which supplies 
the money that keeps Google and its competitors in the search 
business at all.
 
379
 
-china.html (describing new notices to warn Chinese users when a search term 
they are typing might cause their Internet connection to be interrupted). 
 The trademark owners hate it when competi-
 374. See FAQ, GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY REPORT, http://www.google.com/ 
transparencyreport/removals/copyright/faq/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2013) (“We 
link in our search results to the requests published by Chilling Effects in place 
of removed content when we are able to do so legally.”). 
 375. Singhal, supra note 198. 
 376. See generally UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, 718 
F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013).  
 377. Eric Goldman, Why Did Google Flip-Flop on Cracking Down on 
“Rogue” Websites? Some Troubling Possibilities, TECH. & MKTG. LAW BLOG 
(Aug. 22, 2012, 9:46 AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/08/ 
why_did_google.htm. 
 378. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 172–73 (2012) 
(allowing Rosetta Stone’s trademark claims against Google to proceed). The 
case subsequently settled on undisclosed terms. See Stipulation of Voluntary 
Dismissal with Prejudice, Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144 (4th 
Cir. 2012) (No. 1:09-cv-00736). 
 379. The academic literature on keyword advertising and trademarks 
online is immense. Some helpful sources include Margreth Barrett, Internet 
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tors use their trademarks as keywords to trigger advertise-
ments; they have regularly sued both the competitors and 
search engines, the former with somewhat more success.380 As 
against search engines, the consensus seems to be that yes, 
such uses are potentially infringing, but no court has entered a 
judgment that a search engine was actually infringing because 
of its keyword advertising.381
Both the conduit and editor theories are ambiguous here. 
On the conduit theory, perhaps the trademark confers an ex-
clusive right in the trademark owner to use the mark to attract 
customers, so any diversion of customers looking for the mark 
owner is a misdirection of traffic. A search for [coke] should 
lead to the real thing, not an ad for Mocha-Cola.
 
382
The editor theory is no better. One could argue that the 
search engine is not a merchant supplying goods and services 
to compete with trademark owners; it is merely arranging in-
formation about websites in a convenient form, like a drugstore 
placing every brand of cola in the same section.
 Or perhaps 
the search engine is merely a conduit for advertisers’ messages, 
and does not take responsibility for them. Coke should have it 
out with the makers of Mocha-Cola, not with Google. 
383
The advisor theory returns our attention to users. They are 
the ones who create the many meanings of [rosetta stone]; 
the search query is always an approximation of their actual in-
tentions. Some want to buy Rosetta Stone software and want 
the official site, or a retailer settling it, or a comparison of pric-
 Or one could 
argue that the search engine is crafting a deceptive message for 
users: it was asked for [coke] but it served up Mocha-Cola ads 
instead. 
 
Trademark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark Use”, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
371 (2006); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion over Use: 
Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597 (2007); Stacey L. 
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the In-
ternet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777 (2004); Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in 
Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507 (2005); Greg Lastowka, Google’s 
Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1327 (2008). 
 380. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.Com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1237 
(10th Cir. 2013). 
 381. For an example of an especially definitive win for Google, see Google 
Inc. v Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm’n, [2013] HCA 1 (Austl.). 
 382. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1252 (9th Cir. 
1982) (holding that it was trademark infringement to serve Pepsi to customer 
who ordered “Coke” without disclosing substitution to customer). 
 383. See Eric Goldman, Brand Spillovers, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 381, 382–
83 (2009).  
  
2014] SPEECH ENGINES 949 
 
es across multiple retailers. Some are engaged in product re-
search: they want user and expert reviews; others are looking 
to learn more about Rosetta Stone’s competition, using the 
name of the category’s best-known brand as a rough synonym 
for [language learning software]. And some really are 
just looking for the trilingual stele. 
This ambiguity means that there is substantial danger in 
giving any one website exclusive rights to control a search que-
ry: it allows the website to divert a wide range of users with di-
verse interests. At the same time, a disloyal search engine can 
steer users wrong by taking money to show them ads intended 
to divert them from the websites they’re actually looking for. 
Striking the right balance is a subtle affair. It is easy for a 
smartphone shopper to glance at and reject one ad, or to hit the 
back button when she realizes these aren’t the [droids] she’s 
looking for. But the combined effect of a dozen such ads, or a 
hundred, can be significant. At some point, the sheer clutter 
makes it impossible for the user to find the smartphones she 
seeks. And, of course, an openly deceptive ad coupled with a de-
ceptive website can indeed trick the purchaser into buying the 
wrong thing.  
Thus, the advisor theory leads us naturally back to the 
question trademark law is also supposed to ask: are consumers 
likely to be confused? This is a fact-sensitive inquiry; it depends 
on users’ reasons for using a particular query, on how results 
are presented, and on how clearly the paid nature of keyword 
ads is disclosed.384
Additionally, the instant situation does not appear to be a case of 
palming off in the traditional sense. It is akin to the consumer asking 
for a Coca-Cola and receiving a tray with unopened, labeled, authen-
tic cans of Pepsi-Cola, RC Cola, Blue Sky Cola, Dr. Pepper, and 
Sprecher Root Beer, and a copy of Coca Kola: The Baddest Chick, by 
Nisa Santiago. This is a substitution, but given the context it is not 
infringing because it is not likely to confuse.
 One recent case explained that even when 
consumers searched for the plaintiff’s trademark on Amazon 
and the search results did not contain any of plaintiff’s goods, 
confusion was unlikely: 
385
The most recent and careful empirical study in the area 
 
 
 384. Compare Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 
638 F.3d 1137, 1154 (9th Cir. 2011) (paid placement labeled as such), with 
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns, 354 F.3d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 
2004) (paid placement not labeled as such). 
 385. Multi Time Machine, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 926 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1137 
n.4 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 
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found “little evidence of . . . consumer confusion regarding the 
source of goods, but only a small minority of consumers correct-
ly and consistently distinguished paid ads from unpaid search 
results.”386 These results suggest that Google ought to prevail in 
other trademark keyword cases—but also that regulators 
should require clearer differentiation between unpaid organic 
search results and paid search advertisements.387
  CONCLUSION   
 
A good search engine advises its users, helping them to be-
come active listeners, and enabling them to act autonomously. 
Each of these points opens up promising avenues for further 
inquiry. 
First, there is the application of the advisor theory to other 
problems in search-engine law. This Article has dealt primarily 
with search bias, arguing that a search result is problematical-
ly “biased” when it constitutes bad-faith advice to the user. The 
Article has also given brief attention to problems of copyright, 
privacy, defamation, and trademark. But the advisor theory 
can also provide insights into the antitrust cases against 
Google, into search engines’ obligation to filter copyright-
infringing results, into search engines’ obligations in dealing 
with repressive authoritarian governments, into the role of 
search in open access to government information, and into the 
problem of web spam targeting search engines, among other is-
sues. 
Second, there is active listening. Search engines are an ob-
vious case of active listening—but far from the only one. De-
 
 386. David J. Franklyn & David A. Hyman, Trademarks as Search Engine 
Keywords: Much Ado About Something?, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 418, 484 
(2013). 
 387. The FTC currently advises search engines to engage in “clear and con-
spicuous disclosures” of the sponsorship of search ads. Letter from Heather 
Hippsley, Acting Assoc. Dir., FTC Div. of Adver. Practices, to Gary Ruskin, 
Exec. Dir. of Commercial Alert (June 27, 2002), available at http://www.ftc 
.gov/os/closings/staff/commercialalertletter.shtm; Sample Search Engine Gen-
eral Letter from Mary Engle, Assoc. Dir. for Adver. Practices, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n (June 24, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/06/130625searchengine 
generalletter.pdf. It is unclear whether simple labels on search results do an 
adequate job of informing users. See David J. Franklyn & David A. Hyman, 
Review of the Likely Effects of Google’s Proposed Commitments Dated April 25, 
2013, FAIR SEARCH EUROPE (July 1, 2013), http://www.fairsearcheurope.eu/wp 
-content/uploads/2013/07/FS-Survey-Results-on-Effects-of-Googles-Proposed-
Commitments.pdf (finding little effect on consumer behavior from, and sub-
stantial consumer misunderstand of, proposed labels of Google-affiliated con-
tent). 
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scriptively, the fact that listeners can and do make choices 
about which speech to receive helps explain numerous First 
Amendment doctrines.388 And normatively, empowering listen-
ers to make effective choices among speakers is a worthy 
goal.389
And third, user autonomy is an important principle in 
computer and Internet law, one with implications well beyond 
search engines. Consider, for example, the problem of malware. 
Modern operating systems make it difficult or impossible to in-
stall unknown and untrusted software. These rules restrict us-
ers’ choices about which software to run—but might they also 
enhance users’ effective autonomy by protecting them from 
malware that disables their computers and spies on their 
online activity? Other issues that could benefit from a more 
systematic focus on user autonomy include digital rights man-
agement, unauthorized access to computer systems, online con-
tracting, ad-blocking software, Do Not Track, and cell-phone 
unlocking. 
 A well-developed theory of active listening has the po-
tential to enrich First Amendment theory and doctrine. It could 
yield insights into the captive audience doctrine, the status of 
commercial speech, Internet filtering, targeted advertising, tel-
ecommunications regulation, and anonymous speech, among 
other topics. 
As for the advisor theory itself, this way of thinking about 
search may seem cynical about the motivations of websites and 
search engines. Websites are clamoring to be found; they will 
attempt to trick search engines into ranking them highly; fail-
ing that, they will turn to the government and demand the 
same. Search engines, for their part, have the means to mislead 
users. Where their commercial interests are at stake, they can 
be expected to put those interests first if they expect to be able 
to get away with it. In any case pitting a website against a 
search engine, it is best to read the briefs with a grain of salt in 
each hand. 
  
 
 388. See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc., v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 
(1989) (“[T]he message received by one who places a call to a dial-a-porn ser-
vice is not so invasive or surprising that it prevents an unwilling listener from 
avoiding exposure to it.”). 
 389. See, e.g., Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970) 
(“[A] sufficient measure of individual autonomy must survive to permit every 
householder to exercise control over unwanted mail.”); id. at 738 (“If this pro-
hibition operates to impede the flow of even valid ideas, the answer is that no 
one has a right to press even ‘good’ ideas on an unwilling recipient.”). 
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But cynicism should not be mistaken for pessimism. The 
story that the advisor theory tells is profoundly hopeful. It is 
hopeful about users’ capacity for self-fulfillment, and it is hope-
ful about what better search will do for us all. Search is worth 
getting right because it matters, and will continue to matter as 
long as humans are still asking questions of the world and of 
each other.390
 
 
 
 390. Cf. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 176, at 209–10 (“If we want to create 
a vital global public sphere for the digital era by offering the best and the most 
information to the largest number of people around the world . . . [w]e can’t 
just hope that some big, rich company will do it for us. That’s simply irrespon-
sible. . . . The future of knowledge—and thus the future of the species—
depends on getting this right.”). 
